An Election Like No Other in Venezuela

They have been 25 years in power, eight million exiled, thousands murdered, tortured and imprisoned, entire families divided.

By Hector Schamis (Confidencial)

HAVANA TIMES – Seven days remain until an election like no other. That is for Venezuela, of course, as well as for the entire region, considering the close relationships of the Maduro regime with other dictatorships and transnational organized crime. In fact, how this electoral process concludes will have a direct effect on the viability of democracies, which are currently weakened throughout the hemisphere.

Additionally, there are implications for the integrity of the Venezuelan state itself, which is fragmented, lacks territorial control, and is an exporter of crises and criminal organizations. All of this would be exponentially aggravated if another electoral fraud mocks the popular will once again. The exodus amounts to eight million people, 25% of the population. The question is, how much higher could it go in the face of another fraud, the continuing of the regime in power, and inevitably, more repression? That number is unthinkable today.

It is said that democracy is the product of the uncertainty of an electoral outcome supported by rules, in other words, institutions. In Venezuela, it has been the opposite for decades. The difference now is that chavismo is weaker than ever, society is mobilized and “angry” as rarely before, and the opposition is united and cohesive behind the leadership of Maria Corina Machado and the candidacy of Edmundo Gonzalez.

Therefore, in this election “unlike any other”, it is useful to consider three scenarios. First, if the elections actually take on Sunday, July 28th. Second, how the votes will be counted. Third, what kind of government will be formed starting on Monday, the 29th, assuming the undeniable reality that the regime is deeply unpopular. All of the above makes this an open-ended story.

Regarding the first scenario, there are abundant rumors of a suspension. The belligerence with Guyana, the invented assassination attempts on Maduro, the fable of a civil war, and the threat of a bloodbath —as if it hasn’t already happened in this quarter-century— reveal the true campaign agenda of the dictatorship. In other words, a hypothetical and clearly fabricated national security crisis that would prevent voting.

Maduro is like a poker player not only prone but addicted to “bluffing.” Fantastic stories are useful to him; the absurdity is such that no one bothers to refute them. Thus, official paranoia is normalized, the meaning of words is trivialized —such as the use of “civil war” and “bloodbath”— and persecution becomes routine. The regime itself knows that under normal conditions, Maduro cannot win; according to different polls, his defeat ranges between 20 and 35 points. Hence his attachment to crises.

Notice the intensification of persecution of the Vente Venezuela party activists once the campaign officially started, the kidnapping of María Corina Machado’s chief of security, and the sabotage of her vehicles, among other repressive methods. Or the crude closures of hotels, bars, and the now-famous empanada stand “Pancho Grill,” all for serving the campaign caravan.

Despite constant intimidation, crowds continue to follow them with conviction and contagious passion. Suspending the elections on the 28th, therefore, would mean almost complete isolation for Maduro from the democratic world, even among Latin American allies who have supported him. For instance, Lula and Petro have also spoken about the need for free and fair elections and respecting the popular will. In other words, no fraud.

This brings us to the second scenario: the vote counting. There is only one way to count them correctly: to reach the precise number through previously established and guaranteed objective and neutral procedures, table by table, and in data transmission. But there are many ways to count them incorrectly, consider it a scale of possible frauds, a practice in which the regime has ample experience.

The range goes from the two or three points stolen in 2013 to secure Maduro’s victory to the million votes crudely added in the 2017 constituent election, denounced by the electronic voting system company, Smartmatic. An obscene fraud today could start with the nonexistent 10 million votes declared by Maduro during the Esequibo referendum. Massive citizen participation on the 28th is essential to neutralize this.

In my irrational optimism, however, I yearn for another December 2015, when the two-thirds obtained by the MUD opposition coalition were recognized by the regime, albeit under pressure from the army itself. Aren’t there any legalist officers today?

Let’s move now to the third scenario. The day after and the long period of negotiation and transition that will inevitably open, beyond the lack of clarity on the endpoint. Whoever assumes the new presidential term after this election will do so only in January 2025, opening a long stage of extraordinary uncertainty.

Maduro advanced the elections to be “ratified” before the vote takes place in the United States and is attempting a referendum on August 25th to recycle the ethereal notion of “communal power,” a sort of soviets that Hugo Chavez frequently invoked. Intended as a replacement for the democratic representation system, it has always been an idea confined to the realm of rhetoric. It is for Maduro as well.

Venezuela is already in transition; it is not possible to do the same indefinitely. It is inconceivable for Maduro to be sworn in next January and remain until 2031. The authoritarian bloc is cracked and divided; consider all the chavista hierarchs who were purged, imprisoned, and exiled by Maduro. It is no coincidence that high-ranking chavistas speak of “madurismo” and have distanced themselves from the regime. Removing one piece of that mechanism will force many others to change, a sort of domino effect of change.

It is an open-ended story; I can even imagine a regime of cohabitation. Maria Corina has said more than once: everyone needs guarantees to move towards national reconciliation. If not everything, much seems negotiable in this transition full of uncertainties. As Luis Almagro said two years ago, “In the current Venezuelan system, everyone wants everything and prefers nothing over giving in and relinquishing the possibility of having everything.” Perhaps that has changed.

What does not seem negotiable for Venezuelan society is family reunification. Rayma summarized it with one of her moving illustrations. “Why vote?” she asks her characters. “For my granddaughter, my daughter, my mom, the political prisoners…” they respond.

They have been 25 years in power, eight million exiles, thousands murdered, tortured, and imprisoned, entire families split apart; it would not be fair for those numbers to increase. That is exactly what would happen with another spurious victory for Maduro.

Article originally published in Infobae