Nicaraguan Army Chief Ordered Military Role in Repression
Chairman of the UN Expert Group on Nicaragua indicates that an active espionage apparatus from various institutions helps decide who to repress.
HAVANA TIMES – During the 2018 protests in Nicaragua, the head of the Nicaraguan Army, Gen. Julio Cesar Aviles, “ordered the participation of military personnel in the repression,” leading to the loss of Nicaraguan lives, considered extrajudicial executions, reveals the Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) in its new report presented to the United Nations.
German jurist Jan-Michael Simon, chairperson of GHREN, explained in an interview with CONFIDENCIAL that the military’s participation was carried out with “full knowledge” on the part of General Aviles who knew he did not have “competency in public security matters.”
“This (the involvement of the military) occurred on several occasions and included their participation in executions as armed groups in a disguised manner,” Simon indicated.
He also noted that the individual responsibilities of the military leadership, which “is fully identified,” will be made public in a more comprehensive report to be published by April 1, 2025.
The GHREN confirms for the first time in this report the active participation and leadership of the Nicaraguan Army in the 2018 repression and also its responsibility in extrajudicial executions, despite the military authorities having always denied it. What evidence did you find?
We found that the commander-in-chief of the Army ordered the participation of military personnel in the repression of the protests, despite being fully aware he did not have competency in public security. This also implied the loss of human lives. It happened on several occasions, and it allowed them to participate as armed groups in a disguised manner in the executions.
Some may say this is not new, as the Army chief had established it at the time. However, by applying our evidentiary standards that allowed us to reach this conclusion, we can assert it (in this report) with this level of conviction. All of this provides a sufficient basis to open a criminal case on this matter.
The participation of the Army’s Defense Intelligence Directorate in the past and ongoing intelligence gathering mechanism in Nicaragua reveals that the Army not only participated in the executions but also played an active role in processing and gathering information.
The Army has also always been blamed for not disarming illegal paramilitary groups, but the report now confirms that they were also part of these armed groups. What impact does the Army’s direct participation in extrajudicial executions and in supplying military weaponry for the repression of civilians have?
“The impact is that they made a significant contribution to the execution of these people and therefore have a responsibility, not only political or moral but also legal. Specifically, it is important to prove individual participation in the chain of command of certain people.”
The report cites a meeting held on April 20, 2018, between officials from the Special Operations Command and the Doctrinal, Training, Intelligence, and Counterintelligence Directorates, the General Staff, and its leadership, where orders were given from the Presidency to repress a supposed coup planned by social organizations. You mentioned that individual criminal responsibilities could be identified in the Army. What significance does this finding have for the course of the investigation?
“As for the individuals we have identified, we will publish them, not in this report, but by the latest on April 1 in a more comprehensive report. Yes, the leadership will be fully identified.”
Why do I explain this? For a simple formality, we have a restriction on the length of the report we will present, which does not allow us to expand on the basis for why we reached the possible individual responsibility of persons. So, I would like to ask for some patience until this happens.
The report also mentions the Army’s key role in the capture and exile of hundreds of opponents in 2023 and 2024. What does this participation entail?
It’s primarily intelligence work. Essentially, it involves information that converges with other types of information collected by other state entities to identify people who would later be captured at the Intelligence Center operating in the country.
An Alarming Intelligence Apparatus
What is the most alarming finding about the state of repression in this latest phase?
The most alarming finding is that we’ve already conducted 1,500 interviews and received over 7,000 reports and information on the total apparatus managed by the Nicaraguan government to perpetrate these violations. And when I refer to the apparatus, I primarily mean the intelligence apparatus responsible for generating information on whom to select for violations, as well as controlling the population and the chains of command responsible for carrying out the orders once people are selected for these violations.
The report describes a broad intelligence structure created in Nicaragua for total surveillance, with the Army’s participation. How does this espionage structure operate and who is part of it?
“The structure includes the National Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Army.
What happened is that the Police Information and Intelligence Center, a structure typically used to monitor crime in countries with the rule of law, has been instrumentalized in Nicaragua to collect and analyze data on dissidents or those perceived as such. This is also supplemented by information collected by the Financial Analysis Unit, which helps identify and even seize the bank accounts of opponents. Here, it’s used to identify and seize the assets of people targeted by the government.
Then there is the Directorate of Judicial Assistance (El Chipote), as well as police stations and centers of the national penitentiary system, which are also used in the interrogations of detained persons. And to that we should also add in a more formal way the National Intelligence Committee, which is an inorganic structure that brings together representatives of institutions in matters of State security in its entirety and which is basically the center where all the information that will later be used to select people enters in.
In addition to that, there is obviously an electronic surveillance system, and Telcor also plays a role, which not only plays a role in the interception of communications, but rather in surveillance and hybrid incidence, including troll farms that function for harassment.
The other thing is also the structure of the Sandinista Front (FSLN) in its Victory Units, which operate at all levels of public institutions and the territorial structure of the party, from the departments to the neighborhoods and which also actively participate in the collection of information. These units play a key role in ensuring the loyalty of both the state apparatus and society at large to the party and carry out social control and monitoring tasks.
The political secretaries of the party play a very important role both in the state institutions, as well as in the structures below. Also, the Ministry of Health, which carries out its population censuses, has questioned citizens about their location and that of their relatives, as well as their political affiliations.
It is mainly on the intelligence level. Essentially, it’s information that converges with other types of information collected by other state entities to identify people, who would later be captured at the Intelligence Center operating in the country.
What is the most alarming finding about the state of repression in this latest phase?
The most alarming finding is that we have already conducted 1,500 interviews and gathered over 7,000 reports and information on the total apparatus operated by the Nicaraguan government to perpetrate these violations. And when I refer to the apparatus, I’m primarily talking about the intelligence apparatus responsible for generating information on whom to select for violations, as well as controlling the population and the chains of command responsible for carrying out the violations once people are selected.
The report describes how a broad intelligence structure has been created in Nicaragua for total surveillance, with the Army’s participation. How does this espionage structure operate and who makes up this structure?
This structure includes the National Police, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Army.
What happened is that the Police Information and Intelligence Center, a structure typically used to monitor crime in countries with the rule of law, has been instrumentalized in Nicaragua to collect and analyze data on opponents or those perceived as such. This is supplemented by information gathered by the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF), which helps identify and even seize the bank accounts of the opponents. Here, it’s used to identify and seize the assets of people targeted by the government.
Then there’s the Directorate of Judicial Assistance, as well as police stations and centers in the national penitentiary system, which are also used in the interrogation of detained individuals. Additionally, there’s the National Intelligence Committee, an informal structure that brings together representatives from all state security institutions, and which is essentially the central point where all information enters, later used to select individuals for persecution.
Also, obviously, there is an electronic surveillance system, and Telcor plays a role not only in intercepting communications but also in surveillance and hybrid operations, including troll farms used for harassment.
Another element is the structure of the Sandinista Front (FSLN) in its Victory Units, which operate at all levels of public institutions and the party’s territorial structure, from departments to neighborhoods, and which also actively participate in gathering information. These units play a key role in ensuring loyalty to both the state apparatus and society at large to the party, performing social control and monitoring tasks.
The party’s political secretaries play a very important role in both state institutions and in lower structures. The Ministry of Health, which conducts population censuses, has also interrogated citizens about their location and their family members, as well as their political affiliations.
In this intelligence and repression mechanism, who and how decides to imprison, harass, or exile citizens?
Exactly where that decision is made is still unknown. There is much indication that it’s at the National Intelligence Committee, which is where all the information enters. That would be the nucleus and base for this decision. The final decision is made by whoever controls that apparatus, and that’s obviously the leadership of the state. We’ll see if, during a future mandate, we can gather more information from individuals willing to speak with us and provide evidence in this regard.
But have you identified whether, within this chain of command, officials make autonomous decisions about victims or are they directly subordinated to the orders of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo?
There are some who would have a certain autonomy, but we won’t identify them now. That may be looked at later.
About the masked paramilitaries
Have you identified new operatives in this chain of command besides the military personnel you mentioned?
When we talk about the chain of command, we’re talking about using the information gathered to carry out violations. And yes, there are many more names than those publicly known, and they are safeguarded with dossiers containing information based on evidence, upon which we reached the conclusion that these individuals are implicated, as well as their connections to violations.
This information will not be made public and could be used for sanctions and legal actions.
What role do the masked individuals, sworn in by Daniel Ortega’s regime as volunteer police officers, play in this structure?
So far, we only have them at the level of individuals involved in harassment. This structure is not yet clear or precise enough to draw conclusions and include them in the frameworks we’ll present in the annex of our report.
Do you have an assessment on the recent swearing-in of thousands of masked individuals? Is it common for security forces to swear in masked individuals as volunteer police officers?
No, obviously, no public authority with a law enforcement mandate should swear in masked individuals. We haven’t seen this anywhere. While there are some precedents regarding public officials related to law enforcement, who for security reasons would need to mask themselves, this doesn’t happen during their swearing-in but rather during specific operations. This is not a topic we’ve addressed in detail at this time.
The need to gather more evidence and complaints
Besides the Nicaraguans released from prison and exiled by the dictatorship, there are hundreds more who are denied re-entry to the country and thousands more who are denied passport renewals abroad, effectively creating a situation of de facto exile and statelessness. What can democratic states and the international community do to offer a solution to those citizens who cannot return to their country?
First, we need to be a bit cautious with the term “de facto” here. We have information suggesting many of these individuals have been denationalized. So, they could eventually qualify as stateless under the 1954 UN Convention.
We still need reliable information in this regard. But it wouldn’t be de facto, but rather in the sense of the Convention.
Secondly, what’s missing is that countries impacted by Nicaragua’s practices should show solidarity against such practices and provide the necessary documentation and apply the broadest possible criteria for their protection.
Will you continue gathering evidence and testimonies from Nicaraguan victims? How can victims or informants securely communicate with the Expert Group and provide their testimonies and information?
They can always use the contact information on our website. This is absolutely secure, but also through the channels that have been stabilized for three years to communicate with us. Much of the information we’ll publish now is based on information from individuals inside the system, so it’s increasingly important for them to provide more information so we can identify more central nodes in the broad network of violations we’ve detected. We also need to know, with the certainty we apply, which nodes have decision-making autonomy in that apparatus (of repression), beyond the heads of the apparatus.
First published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.