Cuba Has a Secret Way to Get More Oil from Venezuela

Mural of Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA. File photo: Ronald Peña / EFE i

By 14ymedio

HAVANA TIMES – Miguel Diaz-Canel’s podcast, broadcast this Thursday to address the country’s energy situation and blackouts, began with a sad irony: “In recent days, the TV Mesa Redonda (Round Table) program covered this topic extensively, but it’s also true that this happened on one of the days with the worst power deficits, so a large part of the population couldn’t watch it,” said the president. And since, as he acknowledged, “it doesn’t hurt to insist,” he sat down with Vicente de la O Levy, Minister of Energy and Mines, to repeat many points already known, along with a few new ones.

One of the new points—about which no further details are expected, at least through official channels—was the creation of a mechanism with Venezuela to send more oil to the island. The minister explained that Caracas is a partner under attack, boycotted and persecuted, referring to sanctions. De la O Levy was misleading when he claimed this was the reason for Venezuela’s “decline in production,” as the numbers tell a different story: waivers granted to Chevron and other oil companies have allowed Venezuela to significantly increase its output. However, most of its crude and derivatives are sold to China and the United States.

Now, “we found a formula,” the minister hinted. “A formula we’re not going to explain so it doesn’t get targeted,” Díaz-Canel added with a half-smile. “Exactly,” echoed De la O Levy, though he admitted that previous levels of supply won’t be reached.

The core explanations yesterday came down to two things: extremely high demand and extremely low fuel supply. While the authorities reiterated that a large amount of distributed generation had been recovered, in practice this has helped little—because there’s nothing to power it with. “We have 747 megawatts (MW) affected, 300 more than back then,” they said, referencing March as a benchmark to explain the worsening deficit, which was already severe. The program showed a table indicating daytime power demand of up to 2,580 MW two months ago and 3,250 MW at night, compared to 3,050 MW this Thursday and peaks of 3,500 MW at night.

Solar parks are operating, which the minister said is the quickest solution, but the perception is they aren’t helping, since, as he put it, “instead of adding to generation, they’ve been covering the shortfall.” In a “normal” economy, eight million tons of fuel a year are needed—five from imports and three from domestic production. That domestic production “was exponentially declining, not just because of the thermoelectric plants being hit by lack of financing,” he argued.

“If this decline in oil production continues, the time will come when we won’t even have national crude for the thermoelectric plants, which represents our sovereignty,” the minister warned. However, he added, “recovery—or rather, the decline in oil production—has stopped,” and in recent months there’s even been improvement. In fact, in December, the Australian oil company Melbana Energy, which has had exploration rights on the island for a decade, announced that in 2025, it would export Cuban crude for the first time.

Regarding the fuel shortage, De la O Levy made two important clarifications. So far this year, only enough diesel has been imported to last 2.2 months, and only enough fuel oil to run the floating power barges (patanas) for 1.4 months.

That was the only mention of the Turkish power barges, one of which may be preparing to leave the island if confirmed that the cargo ship OK has arrived in Havana to retrieve the Suheyla Sultan. On Thursday, official state media accused 14ymedio of lying for suggesting that such a large tugboat seemed intended to remove the barge, insisting instead that the ship “is part of the company and is arriving at its logistical base in Havana,” without further detail. There was no mention in the presidential podcast—likely recorded earlier—of the “gradual” withdrawal of the Turkish floating plants, which the minister himself announced months ago and his deputy, Jesús Abad Vigoa, reiterated last week in statements to Granma, calling the possibility of their removal “a latent risk” given the Cuban state’s difficulties in meeting financial commitments.

The issue of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) used for cooking was also discussed—highly concerning, given the alarming numbers: out of the 150 days so far this year, Cuba has gone without gas for 117 of them—the same number of days the LPG ship sat idle in Santiago de Cuba. Its cargo finally began being sold this Tuesday in the eastern provinces. Diaz-Canel admitted that the situation is “desperate” and “makes life very hard,” again blaming international sanctions for the deficit. They said the ship arrived in February, but financing couldn’t be secured. There were no post-payment options, and once funding was obtained, banking issues delayed the deposit… and so on, a string of problems apparently repeating now with a second “contracted and paid-for” vessel.

The lack of gas increases electricity demand by 200 to 250 MW, they explained. And that was the other key focus of Thursday’s program. Díaz-Canel stressed: “I insist, I understand all the issues with the heat, the drought problems too, but 3,000 MW of demand at midday was not normal in this country.” Two days ago, an inspector from the Electric Union (UNE) visited a household in Central Havana to question unusually high energy consumption. From the authorities’ statements yesterday, it’s clear this wasn’t just a one-off case, it’s part of a broader strategy.

“Havana does indeed have a significant shortfall in the residential sector,” said the energy minister, who called for increased oversight of businesses, institutions, and consumers alike. He specifically focused on those living near priority circuits (including those that serve hospitals). “Customers in those circuits are more advantaged, yes, but that can be addressed. A restrictive plan must be applied to consumers—whether state-owned or not—on those circuits. And we must monitor them daily. For those in circuits that don’t experience outages, we have the right to demand they use electricity rationally,” he concluded.

Both the president and the minister warned—again—that there’s a plan going beyond the summer, aiming for energy sovereignty. In the short term, they envision two possible scenarios for July: if fuel is secured, things should go well; if not, they’re counting on solar parks during the day and the recovery of the Santa Cruz del Norte thermoelectric plant to get through the summer. In any case, they hedged their bets with a revealing disclaimer: “We can’t say or guarantee that we’ll reach zero blackouts.”

First published in Spanish by 14ymedio and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.

Read more from Cuba here on Havana Times.

One thought on “Cuba Has a Secret Way to Get More Oil from Venezuela

  • It is truly rare for the Castro regime to issue a public statement with bad news. Instead, Cuban wordsmithing usually goes something like this: “…the (insert name of industry or ministry) is disappointed the production of (insert name of product) will achieve 80% of our planned output for the year. However, because of the hard work of the Cuban people, we expect to exceed these goals in the upcoming year.” The truth is likely 50% instead of the 80% and next year is likely going to be worse. Given their track record, take everything you just read in the above post and cut it in half.

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