Cuba with Less and Less Power… and Hope Fading
As if the countless hours of blackouts weren’t enough, now there’s no way to know when the power will come back on or how long it will last.
By Daniel Valero (Progreso Weekly)
HAVANA TIMES – When rumors spread in Camagüey at the start of this summer that a new blackout schedule would take effect—alternating nine hours of power outages with three hours of electricity outages—public discontent was so widespread that provincial authorities decided not to take on the challenging task of providing explanations.
The new schedule resulted in longer power outages, which normally lasted around twelve hours a day. With the 9×3 schedule, Camagüeyans had to endure up to 18 hours a day without electricity.
Ultimately, people had no choice but to accept the fait accompli. What no one could have foreseen was that less than four months later, even that controversial rotation would be remembered with longing due to the worsening electricity crisis. The six hours of daily service planned by the 9×3 rotation now seem like a luxury for families who survive on three hours of electricity per day, or even less.
As if the countless hours of blackouts weren’t enough, now there’s no way to know when the power will come back on or how long it will last. Recently, they’ve been turning it on and off multiple times before it stabilizes. In that “trick,” last week they burned out the water heater at the milk cooling center near my house, one of the few still running on the Santa Cruz highway. When the cooperative went to complain to the electric company, they were told it was their fault for not maintaining the equipment. If that’s the response they give the State for destroying a water heater used to store over a thousand liters of milk, what can a citizen expect the day they complain about a “cold” or a burned-out TV?” lamented Mayelín, a farmer living near the Rescate community of Sanguily, ten kilometers south of Camagüey.
Many residents of that area compare current times to when blackouts began every evening at six o’clock and lasted until dawn. “Even in the worst-case scenario, you knew that the power would be back on at six o’clock the next morning, and that it wouldn’t be cut off again until six in the evening. It was torture to sleep and do things at night, but at least it allowed you to get organized,” Mayelín thinks.
Between a Lack of Communication and Triumphalism
Whenever they can, the leaders of the Electric Union (UNE) and other government bodies emphasize the importance of “the population to stay informed through official channels.” It’s a message so often repeated by the authorities that it no longer makes sense to most people.
Often, official channels are inaccessible. For example, in Camagüey, since the start of summer, radio and television outages have been frequent, caused by the failures of the RadioCuba relay center. “There’s a generator there, but its fuel supply isn’t enough for the entire month, much less with the current rate of blackouts. At some point, there’s no choice but to disconnect it and leave the entire province without signal,” explained an employee of Radio Cadena Agramonte, the provincial station.
Cadena Agramonte has also stopped broadcasting due to a lack of diesel for its generator, something that didn’t happen even during the worst years of the Special Period, the same source recalled. In the first half of August, the situation reached the point where they had to improvise a transmission studio at the ETECSA regional center, which does have a stable supply of fuel for its energy independence.
Near Total Blackout in Santiago de Cuba
Other less favored provinces, like Santiago de Cuba, have had to shut down their radio stations entirely. One recent example was on September 10, when CMKC Radio Revolución went off the air after broadcasting the provincial newscast. “How can this be possible? How do I inform myself and the people? It’s truly inconceivable that this is happening to the most listened-to radio station in Santiago de Cuba,” journalist Miguel Noa Menéndez questioned on Facebook. In the comments on his post, communicators from other eastern provinces warned that similar situations are everyday in towns like Manzanillo and Puerto Padre, where Radio Granma and Radio Libertad have been off the air for up to a week due to power outages.
Along with the lack of information, triumphalism is another issue Cubans face regularly. This was clear in the newspaper Escambray during an interview with executives from the Sancti Spíritus province electricity company, published in June.
At one point in the conversation, the reporter asked her interviewees about the real benefits expected from the new photovoltaic parks. “It is popularly said that the more parks, the more blackouts…” she pointed out. In response, both officials had no choice but to admit that the 21.8 megawatts (MW) of power at each of these sites, often mentioned by authorities at the start of the investment program, only represents their maximum nominal capacity. “They don’t generate it steadily, but rather about 8 or 10. They can only reach 21 MW at a time.” Until then, no one with professional training and authority had provided this explanation; instead, the official message had always implied that the parks could reach—and maintain—their maximum power output most of the day.
The gap between potential capacity and actual power generation is significant. Two days after this wave of major blackouts reached Havana, on Wednesday, September 17, the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente de la O Levy, announced at a press conference that the island currently has 656 MW of photovoltaic generating capacity out of the 1,000 MW planned to be installed by the end of 2025. According to estimates made months earlier by his ministry, with this capacity, the parks were expected to supply at least 500 MW during peak sunlight hours. However, in reality, they only reach about “one point during the day”—just a few minutes—as is often highlighted in the daily report broadcast from UNE headquarters; the rest of the time, their contribution hovers around 300 MW.
No Money for More Generation
In February 2018, Cubadebate announced that blackouts would occur across the island during the final days of that month due to the shutdown of the Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric plant and the three units at Diez de Octubre. The shutdown of both plants meant that the 300 MW from the Matanzas plant and the 360 MW from the units in Nuevitas would be removed from the system.
Seven years later, the “Guiteras” plant still does not reach 250 MW, and the two units operating at Diez de Octubre barely total 180 MW. The net power loss between the two plants exceeds 230 MW. Adding the accumulated losses at other thermoelectric plants, such as Lidio Ramón Pérez (270 MW less) and Antonio Maceo (100 MW less), illustrates the scale of the crisis and how hard it will be to overcome.
Between 2014 and 2024, national electricity production decreased by 25 percent, especially that produced by thermoelectric units, which rely on Cuban crude oil—and thereby supply cheaper electricity—forming the core of the system.
Out of all the thermal units in the country, only two have been in operation for less than 30 years. These are located in Felton: Plant 1, synchronized in 1996, and Plant 2, in 2000 (although the latter has been out of service since 2021 due to a major fire). The rest are between 35 and 50 years old, well beyond the maximum usage time recommended by manufacturers for this type of technology.
Using the failed project of the four units planned for construction in Santa Cruz del Norte and Mariel over the last decade as a reference, it is possible to estimate the cost to restore the island’s thermoelectric infrastructure or at least restore its capacity from the early 2000s. Assuming an average cost of $1.5 million per MW, it would take nearly $3 billion in investments to achieve a baseline production of 2,000 MW.
Under current conditions, proposing this is impossible. First, because the Cuban electricity industry cannot be profitable. Contrary to what many might think, increasing production does not lead to higher revenue for the state budget; instead, it results in increased expenses due to subsidies that cover most domestic and commercial bills. Additionally, electricity bills are paid in pesos, which the UNE cannot later exchange for the dollars needed to operate its plants.
Despite this, since 2019, the government has tried various ways to promote optimism among the people. Phrases like “arriving in better condition this summer” and campaigns such as the one that made photovoltaic parks the main hope for “a change in the energy matrix” that would reduce dependence on imported fuels have appeared. All of them ended up being a source of ridicule or disappointment.
After six years of crisis, energy increasingly defines the line between success and struggle for Cubans. While a lucky few install batteries and solar panels in their homes, thousands of other families barely manage to obtain power banks and rechargeable fans, and many more—the vast majority—cannot afford even that. The latter can only wait for the few hours when the UNE provides service.