Is Cuba Really on the Path Toward Decentralization?

By La Joven Cuba

HAVANA TIMES – Numerous Cuban experts have warned about the need to dismantle the verticality of decision-making processes as one of the unavoidable steps to exit, or at least mitigate, the crisis in Cuba. However, despite the recurring discourse around decentralization, implementing it requires more than political will and public calls. Concrete actions and a legal framework that promotes it and sustains it over time are essential.

For that reason, the new Decree 140/2025 of the Council of Ministers, “On the Decentralization of Powers and Transfer of Resources to the Territories,” published in the Official Gazette, deserves examination. The document is aimed at achieving the much-discussed municipal autonomy; hence its stated objective is to establish the general bases for a gradual process of decentralizing powers, functions, attributions, and resources from the bodies of the Central State Administration toward the municipalities.

The process is guided by five fundamental principles:

1. Gradualness: it will be carried out in progressive stages over time.
2. Flexibility and heterogeneity: it will adapt to the specific characteristics and needs of each territory.
3. Subsidiarity: decisions must be made at the level of government closest to the citizen (municipal), whenever possible.
4. Equity and comprehensive human development: it must prioritize the impact on the population’s well-being and quality of life.
5. Definitive and binding character: once completed, the transfer is irrevocable and mandatory for all parties.

Powers conferred directly by the Constitution to the Central Administration are not to be decentralized, nor those related to strategic sectors defined in Article 9, such as defense, foreign relations, monetary policy, telecommunications, non-renewable natural resources, water, among others.

For its implementation, the Council of Ministers is established as the highest authority and approves the powers to be decentralized and the timelines. To that end, a Temporary National Decentralization Commission will be created, presided over by a deputy prime minister, tasked with proposing to the Council of Ministers the decentralization plan, as well as directing, monitoring, and evaluating the entire process, mediating between central bodies and territories, and guaranteeing transparency and access to information.

The bodies of the Central State Administration must train the territories, a responsibility shared between the ministries of Education and Science and the Local Organs of Popular Power through the creation of local commissions that facilitate implementation of the process, participate in mediation, exercise the new powers, and inform the population.

Potential Challenges or Areas of Ambiguity

The decree, as is common in some Cuban laws, is not specific regarding key concepts such as “gradualness,” “stages,” “exceptionality,” “sufficient resources,” etc. Moreover, it does not define objective criteria for determining the order, pace, or conditions for a municipality to advance in the process, leaving a wide margin of discretion to the National Commission and the Council of Ministers.

Although it stipulates that the transfer must be accompanied by resources, clear indicators are not established to define which resources would be decentralized and in what quantity. Nor are criteria specified to determine why and under what conditions an exception would be made to transfer powers to the provincial level instead of the municipal one, which could be used to retain power at an intermediate level. It follows that all these decisions will also fall to the aforementioned commission, responsible for charting the true decentralization policy by issuing the necessary regulatory provisions.

It is contradictory that a regulation designed to guide a decentralization process replicates a “top-down” approach, in which the territories have more of a consultative than co-design role; the functions and powers of the local administrative organs of Popular Power are more mandatory than propositional (Art. 15). The fact that the Council of Ministers retains the final authority to approve everything (Art. 10), as well as the capacity to add more exclusions to decentralization (Art. 9, subsection m), concentrates veto power and the ability to redefine the process at the central level.

The decree, therefore, contains a constrained conception of decentralization focused on the Central State – Local Organs relationship. And although it is essential to address the dynamic between different levels of government, the citizen participation contemplated in the document is limited to informing social and mass organizations, as well as the general population, about actions linked to the decentralization process (Art. 15, subsection e). It does not establish mandatory channels for public consultation, hearings, or citizen oversight in the design or monitoring of transfers. Nor does it envisage the creation of an independent appeals or arbitration body to resolve disputes over resources or the scope of powers. Mediation is internal to the Commission, which implies that here, too, there is a substantial margin of discretion without counterbalances.

Although Chapter IV includes “Capacity Building,” its success depends on the will and resources of the ministries and central bodies (Art. 17), the very same that are ceding power, which could undermine incentives for robust training.

On the other hand, although it is not a problem directly stemming from the decree, it is well known that municipal administrations tend to be precarious spaces where multiple problems are evident: lack of managerial preparation, insufficient salaries, low motivation, bureaucratism, etc., all of which form a breeding ground for corruption, favoritism, misuse of resources, among others. The frequency of removals of local-level directors for such issues is evidence of this.

No less important is noting that decentralization at the budgetary level, without proper calculations and support, could increase territorial inequality by conditioning the functioning of public services (such as health and education) on the productive capacity of each municipality.

It is therefore worth warning that increasing the decision-making capacity of local governments without a policy to correct the problems and distortions that affect them, nor a strengthening of transparency and accountability mechanisms, is highly risky and could open the door to greater setbacks.

In conclusion, Decree 140/2025 is more a statement of intent than a true decentralizing public policy. The path to follow will be dictated by the National Commission and the Council of Ministers, so it will be necessary to wait for these entities to publish the guidelines in order to assess successes and missteps.

The success or failure of the decentralization process in Cuba will not be judged by decrees, regulations, laws, or speeches, but by political decisions that turn the transfer of resources and decisions into something tangible. This, insofar as real mechanisms of citizen participation and control are created so that the process responds to grassroots interests rather than the conveniences of the bureaucratic apparatus.

First published in Spanish by La Joven Cuba and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.

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