Are the USA’s Unilateral Sanctions on Cuba a Good Thing?
Should we defend or question these coercive measures?
HAVANA TIMES – Between entertainment and justice, the debate over the imposition of unilateral coercive measures by the United States toward Cuba once again had its moment. Some are even quick to claim that such measures do not exist at all.
The recent vote in the United Nations General Assembly—beyond the symbolic victories claimed by both sides of the political spectrum, and beyond the non-binding nature of the result—is the most important annual action of Cuban diplomacy in its effort to maintain unfavorable international opinion toward this US policy.
The debate, however, tends to focus on whether the sanctions serve as a justification for the Cuban government’s failures, or on denouncing that past events such as nationalizations and confiscations of businesses are not taken into account. But Cuban public opinion rarely reflects in depth on the legal and democratic grounds upon which sanctions against a State should be judged.
Regardless of the political aspirations of different Cuban sectors, selective use of international norms is common. On one side, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is often invoked to denounce violations in Cuba; on the other, the principle of state sovereignty contained in the UN Charter. In principle, all political positions appear to agree that the international legal framework is valid—until it isn’t, as in the case of the United States’ unilateral measures.
Article 2.1 of the UN Charter establishes the principle of sovereign equality, which implies that each State has full authority over its internal affairs and the right to decide its political, economic, and social system without external interference. Any attempt to subordinate a State in the exercise of these rights is therefore a violation of that principle.
But if one of the reasons why an important sector of Cubans supports US sanctions is the lack of democracy in Cuba, one must ask: why assume that progress should be sought through antidemocratic mechanisms that also violate international law? What sense does it make to use UN norms for some cases while disregarding them in others? Is that a democratic stance?
A question often evaded in public debate is that accepting violations of sovereignty—and of international law more generally—would open the door for any State to sanction another under a similar pretext or to take unilateral measures of any kind with total impunity, and furthermore, for such actions to be normalized.
Put another way, if one State can violate several articles of the UN Charter with impunity and receive support for doing so, would not any other State be equally empowered to violate other norms of international consensus, such as human rights treaties? Where, then, would the democratic standard lie?
It is true that international law is often violated. But that reality does not nullify its validity or usefulness. The principles on which it stands—sovereignty, self-determination, non-coercion, and the peaceful settlement of disputes—are the product of multilateral consensus. For that reason, sanctions imposed outside that collective framework, without Security Council authorization, are considered illegal.
This differs from sanctions with multilateral approval, which respond to specific unlawful conduct by the targeted State—conduct contrary to international law. In the case of Cuba, the measures are punitive, unilateral (because there is no consensus regarding their implementation), and broad in scope. According to the US justification, they are not the consequence of any specific illegal act but are intended to promote regime change.
Therefore, regardless of the annual vote’s outcome, the sanctions framework lacks a basis that would make it legal. Under the UN normative framework:
• “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason, in the internal or external affairs of another State” (Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970).
• “No State may use economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights” (Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 1974, Art. 32).
These are the principles of non-intervention and non-coercion. Actions contrary to these principles would imply accepting that each country has a blank check to violate them whenever it sees fit. This is why—rather than because of political sympathies—the overwhelming vote against the US measures against Cuba can be interpreted as it was.
And these are the reasons why, despite pressure from the White House resulting in 7 votes against Cuba’s resolution and 12 abstentions, most countries voted against unilateral measures. Governments of all political leanings—including those on the right—did so, some with distant relations with Cuba but with clarity about the danger of normalizing such actions as tools for provoking change in another country’s internal politics.
As Lee Schlenker summarized for Responsible Statecraft, “other US allies in Europe and Latin America, critical of Cuba’s political and economic system, have maintained a firm stance against the imposition of unilateral coercive measures, which—they argue—violate international law, impoverish the Cuban people, and do little to incentivize human rights or economic reform on the Island.”
We at La Joven Cuba emphasize that beyond ideological positions on Cuba, the larger issue is this: accepting and applauding a State’s imposition of coercive measures contrary to international law, for political purposes, amounts to renouncing the principle of legality in international relations. What democracy is being defended if fundamental norms are justified in being violated?
Any solution to the Cuban crisis, respectful of international law, should aim to promote the normalization of relations—something that necessarily requires the end of sanctions and Cuba’s removal from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. It is not impossible; in 2016, no country voted against the anti-embargo resolution at the UN, and the United States abstained. Just a few diplomatic gestures were enough to improve the lives of millions of Cubans.
None of this exonerates the Cuban government of its responsibility to guarantee citizen participation, economic well-being, and structural reforms.
In the country’s current situation, responsibility is shared between government management and the effects of sanctions. Trying to equate the impact of both factors, or to determine which weighs more, does nothing to benefit Cubans or improve their situation. What can make a real difference is substantial transformation in both internal policy and the external environment—and that implies a change in US policy toward Cuba.