The Red Line of US Policy Towards Cuba Since JFK’s Time
as seen by Elliot Abrams
By Vicente Morin Aguado
HAVANA TIMES – Elliot Abrams recently granted a historically significant interview to Cuban journalist Juan Manuel Cao (In Depth, America TV, April 4). He maintains that “Cuba is not a danger to the United States, it is a problem.”
Considered a Hawk by the global left, involved at the highest level in US politics from Carter to the present, much more committed to Republicans, especially Reagan and Bush Jr., a fragment of the opinions of Abrams, affiliated with the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations), is reproduced below:
Juan Manuel Cao: Cuba, for example, may not be important, it is not big, but it serves the big enemies [of the US], Russia, China, North Korea, it is a danger 90 miles away, it is serious.
Elliot Abrams: “It changed during the October crisis (1962), then for a while with Reagan, Central America, but then, as always, Latin America receives much less attention than Europe or Asia. It changes for a year, two, three years. Yes, it’s a mistake, but well, the danger comes from Russia, China, Iran, not from Brazil, Argentina, or Cuba, not really from Cuba today. It has a very good intelligence service, but it’s not a danger to the United States, the Russians are not very interested in Cuba or Venezuela today.
Juan Manuel Cao: That was Ana Belén Montes’ mission, to say that Cuba was not a danger. Cuba was interested in not being seen as a danger, but right now, sorry to contradict you despite your experience, Cuba is sending mercenaries to Russia, Cuba serves as a repeater antenna for all Russian propaganda towards Latin America, plus there is the danger of the Havana Syndrome, “Sixty Minutes” -CBS News- just did a report that has had an impact…
Elliot Abrams: I would use the word problem and not danger, because during the crisis with Kennedy we agreed with Russia that they would never put dangerous weapons in Cuba, nuclear ones for example, missiles against the United States.
Juan Manuel Cao: In exchange, sorry, for not trying to produce a system change…
Elliot Abrams: Yes, Yes…
Juan Manuel Cao: Cubans lost out in that story.
Elliot Abrams: Yes, of course, that problem always, it’s an agreement WITH THE REGIME, against the people, it’s always like that. In the case of Venezuela, I was going to tell you that we have received information that missiles were going to arrive from Iran that could reach the US, dangerous weapons, and in 2020 we told Iran and the Iranians that that is not acceptable, and if you put missiles in Venezuela that could reach the United States we are going to destroy those missiles, AND THEY HAVEN’T DONE IT.
Juan Manuel Cao: What is the red line?
Elliot Abrams: Well, those weapons seem to be the limit, what we can accept, and they have accepted that there are limits, but beyond the limits, we see Latin America as a problem and not as a danger.
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Abrams goes on to characterize a boundary defined by military danger, defined as a destructive action towards the United States. It seems that Cuba was granted, in fact, a wide range of aggressive actions, to the extent of sending armed groups, in some cases entire armies, to a large number of countries, training foreign guerrillas on their own soil, adding many other forms of subversion, including within the United States itself.
Given that the starting point dates back to the missile crisis of 1962, which concluded on October 28th through what can be called a last-minute political understanding, let us remember the end of that event, expressly provoked by Fidel Castro, with the support of the then superpower Soviet Union.
On the night of the 27th, Robert Kennedy, brother of the president, then Attorney General, met in a place in Washington with the USSR ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. Given the urgency of the matter, the Soviet diplomat sent a cable to Moscow, detailing what had been discussed. From this declassified document, I copy:
“The most important thing for us,” emphasized R. Kennedy, “is to achieve as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to stop the construction work of missile bases in Cuba and to take measures under international control that make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange, the US government is willing, in addition to repealing all “quarantine” measures, to guarantee that there will be no invasion of Cuba and that other countries in the Western Hemisphere are willing to give the same guarantees.”
It should be considered that the day before, on October 26, Fidel Castro had suggested to Krushchev the convenience of being the first to use the atomic weapon, and on the morning of the 27th, he pressured the Russians to shoot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane from the United States, shot down to the east of the Island.
Although the Kremlin had ruled out Castro’s participation in the talks, Moscow communists wanted to preserve at least what has since been called a Russian aircraft carrier, unsinkable, 90 miles from the United States.
The Soviet demand did not contradict Kennedy because even long before the crisis he had shown no intention of militarily intervening in the now socialist island. The non-desire to intervene was confirmed by denying air support to Brigade 2506 during the CIA’s Bay of Pigs operation on April 18, 1961.
After listening to Nikita Khrushchev’s intervention on Radio Moscow on October 28, accepting the proposals transmitted by his ambassador in Washington, John F. Kennedy called his predecessor in the White House, Dwight D. Eisenhower, exchanging opinions.
JFK clarifies to Eisenhower his position regarding the only condition imposed by Khrushchev: “That we are not going to invade Cuba. That is the only one we have now. But in no way do we plan to invade Cuba under these conditions. If we can get them out, we will be much better off”.
Later, Kennedy responds to the suspicions of Eisenhower..
JFK: “That’s why I don’t think Cuban history can be forgotten. I think we will retain enough freedom to protect their interests if he -Eisenhower interrupts-: “That’s all I want…”. JFK: “… if he, if they engage in subversion, if they try to carry out any aggressive act and so on, then all bets are off”. (Taken from the papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential papers. JFKPOF-TPH-41-2).
The long history of Cuban interventionism in the world was the response to Kennedy’s suspicions; however, since then and until today, over the course of 12 US administrations, the bets have not been cancelled.
That urgent understanding, determined by the withdrawal of the nuclear threat, did not grant Cuba, much less the subsequent godchildren of Castro still in action, a free hand to execute an aggressive policy that, without reaching Elliot Abrams’ red line, has been, in fact, a danger to the National Security of the United States.
I want to repeat that contrary to a widely held belief, there was never a treaty, agreement, pact, signed between the parties on the verbal commitment assumed on October 27 and 28, 1962.
Espionage, whose data is shared with countries that according to the doctrine defined by Abrams are a real danger to the US, the Havana Syndrome, Cuban mercenaries in the service of Russia in Ukraine, and, above all, the migration crisis, fueled by Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, with the complicity of the current Mexican president, constitute a dangerous new type of red line for the United States.
Meanwhile, there is a historical lesson for the freedom fighters of Cuba: one should not expect US military intervention, the alternative solution to communist totalitarian dictatorship depends on the Cubans themselves.