Jorge Castañeda on Mexico’s Difficult Crossroads with Donald Trump
According to former Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first visit to Latin America will be only to certain US allies. He’ll also have a very complex meeting in Panama.
By Carlos F. Chamorro (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES – Mexico finds itself on the frontlines of conflict with Donald Trump’s return to the presidency, just as all Latin America is attempting to retool their US relations. Its important weight in US immigration, the multi-million-dollar trade between the two countries, and the US drug epidemic that authorities blame on Mexican drug trafficking cartels have combined to put Mexico in the crosshairs.
In a conversation with Confidencial director Carlos F. Chamorro, aired on the online television news program Esta Semana, former Mexican foreign minister Jorge Castañeda analyzed the “imperial presidency” of Donald Trump, especially the tensions between the United States and the Mexican government around Trump’s announced measures on immigration, security, and tariffs. Castañeda is a well-known political analyst and a professor at New York University.
“Clearly, Trump’s principal theme is immigration. He’s said many times that he won the election thanks to having made immigration the center of his campaign. It’s the topic that promises the greatest media coverage, and it’s the easiest place for him to demonstrate that he’s fulfilling his campaign promises by deporting x number of people,” Castañeda stated.
He went on to point out some disadvantages Mexico faces: “Mexico is well-placed to negotiate with Donald Trump, but not in good shape to resist, because Mexico is at a disadvantage when compared to the US Sixty percent of our electricity comes from natural gas plants, and we import 70% of the gas those plants burn from Texas. We only have two days’ worth of storage capacity,” he warned.
Castañeda also spoke of the first visit US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is planning to make to Latin America. Normally, the first visit is to Mexico, “given the closeness, the size and the history.” However, the new Secretary of State’s itinerary “appears to suggest that the United States principally values its friends and allies,” such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Panama, where he’ll face “a very complex meeting,” given Trump’s pretensions of “recovering” control of the Panama Canal.
Donald Trump’s second term in office, which began just over a week ago, has been characterized as an “Imperial Presidency” by several international analysts. What are the global implications of this?
It has two implications. First is the internal effect within the United States, an aspect that perhaps is less concerning to those of us who don’t live there and aren’t US citizens. But it’s very serious, since what’s happening amounts to an attack on the public liberties, the rule of law, and a series of advances US society has been able to make in the last 50 years. This attack could end up being very harmful, very poisonous to that society. And in the long run, it’s going to affect us, because in the end everything that happens in the US affects other countries of the world.
Then there are the announced measures that have direct and immediate international repercussions. That includes the topic of deportation, the closing of the border, the threat of tariffs on Mexico, Canada, China, and the entire world. There are also a series of measures regarding organized crime that could affect many countries, outstanding among them, Mexico.
Given its weight in US immigration and also the weight of trade relations, Mexico is the Latin American country that’s on the frontlines of conflict with the Trump presidency. In your opinion, which among the different topics you’ve mentioned is Trump’s priority? And how prepared is the Mexican government to confront this challenge?
Clearly, Trump’s primary topic is immigration. It was a central focus of his campaign, and he’s stated a number of times that he won the election thanks to having made the immigration question the heart of his campaign. It’s also the topic that can command the greatest media attention, and thus the easiest place for him to demonstrate that he’s keeping his campaign promises by expelling x number of people.
It’s very difficult to determine whether they’re deporting the same number of people as before, or more, or less people than before. We don’t have a way to know, much less the US public. The only thing we see are the photos of the planes on US television, full of Guatemalans being flown back there. The topic of immigration is the most important one with Mexico, and it’s also the most complex, because it affects us in four different ways.
First, the deportations of Mexican nationals who are in the United States and facing an imminent risk of being deported to Mexico. In some cases, these are people who have been living there for 10, 15, or 20 years, without legal status.
Secondly, it affects us because Mexicans are going to face more difficulties entering the United States whether or not they have legal documents, but especially those without. This emigration has traditionally been an escape valve in Mexico, and without a doubt that escape is going to close, raising the price the polleros charge for getting our people into the US.
The third factor is the possible deportation of non-Mexicans to Mexico. This could result if undocumented immigrants in the US, or those who were allowed in under the Humanitarian Parole program – especially Nicaraguans, Cubans, Venezuelans, or Haitians – are refused entry into their countries, or if there’s resistance of different kinds to receiving them. I don’t know if Daniel Ortega is going to receive airplanes full of Nicaraguans or not, but I do know that if Daniel Ortega won’t receive them, then the United States is going to try and send them to Mexico, arguing that Mexico was the last country they were in, which is true.
And the fourth front, which is also very complex, is that a great many non-Mexicans – tens of thousands – are currently in Mexico, and immigrants are going to continue arriving in Mexico, but will encounter ever greater obstacles in reaching the United States. So, what will they do then? Probably they’re going to stay in Mexico, and we’re not in conditions to be able to assist tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of Guatemalans, Salvadorans, Hondurans, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Ecuadorans, etc. correctly, in a humanitarian manner. At the very least, what the Mexican government should do is to demand of Trump that he cover the costs, pay the bill, meaning the cost of attending to all the people who are going to be left trapped in Mexico. Those costs should be borne by the U.S. government.
Is Mexico in a condition to negotiate with the United States, or is it in an overly vulnerable position? President Sheinbaum has already said she’ll receive deported Mexicans, but not those from other countries, that they’ll seek resources to send them on somewhere else.
She’s said these two things, but she also said that if the US officials insist, then Mexico will receive them. So, we don’t know exactly what’s going on.
At any rate, yes, Mexico is in a place to negotiate, but if you talk about resisting, I’d say no. Not because this government is any stronger or weaker than others, but because Mexico as a country finds itself in a disadvantageous position with respect to the United States. Sixty percent of our electricity comes from natural gas plants, and we import 70% of the natural gas we consume for this from Texas. We have a storage capacity of maybe two days. They can cut off our natural gas supply whenever they want, and how many days could we hold out?
The other topic is the tariffs on Canadian and Mexican products that Trump says he will increase on February 1. What consequences might this have? If Mexico adopts a policy of retaliation with these tariffs, what economic effects could such an escalation have?
We’ll have to see whether tariffs are or are not leveled on Mexican products on February 1, and if they’re on all Mexican products or a chosen few. We don’t know this. We do know that the Mexican economy can’t stand up under a general 25% tariff.
Mexican exports to the United States represent more or less 30% of our gross national product. We’re not in condition to resist a tariff of that magnitude on all our products.
In May 2019, Trump threatened a 25% tariff, but the Mexican government – at that time under Manuel Lopez Obrador – gave in immediately. This time, we don’t know if Trump is going to threaten and if President Claudia Sheinbaum will give in; or if Trump is going to apply the tariff, and condition its lifting on a series of future Mexican gestures, policies, and decisions. It’s very hard to know. What I am convinced of, is that Mexico would have great difficulty resisting a measure of that type.
Do the alleged threats to US security, the topic of fentanyl and the Mexican drug-trafficking cartels, enter into this negotiation and the transactions involving immigration, tariffs and security?
Yes, they enter into it, because Trump has said they do, and one of the main criteria he’ll use to see if Mexico is cooperating with the United States is whether the shipments of fentanyl are reduced in a drastic and significant manner. In pursuit of that, Trump could demand that Mexico accept a US military presence: in the ports of Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas in Sinaloa, for example, where fentanyl is made and where it’s shipped from; or along some of the highways and railroads that go from Sinaloa to the United States, especially the Nogales border crossing. We don’t know if he’ll demand this, or maybe he already has, but we do know that he’s said one of his criteria is reducing dramatically the volume of fentanyl that’s going from Mexico to the United States. How to confirm that? How to succeed at it? The truth is, no one knows.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has announced his upcoming first trip to Latin America. He won’t visit any of the region’s large countries, only the U.S. allies in the Central American Integration System: Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, leaving out Nicaragua and Honduras. What’s the US and its Secretary of State’s objective and message in this tour?
It’s difficult to know, because they haven’t issued any further explanations as to why they’re going to these countries, and not to Mexico for example. Normally the first foreign relations secretary to be received by the new US Secretary of State is that of Mexico, given the closeness, the size, the history. What this planned trip seems to suggest is that they’re principally interested only in their friends. That’s what most interests Marco Rubio. And that’s what he’s going to do, as demonstrated clearly with the exclusion of Mexico, and especially the exclusion of Honduras. Excluding Nicaragua and Venezuela is understandable. With Honduras, there’s a complex situation in which President Xiomara Castro has said some things that have perhaps caused irritation in the United States, such as talk of eliminating the [military] bases.
But at any rate, it gives the impression that Rubio has clearly worked out who he wants to be friends with and who no, and who he’s going to discuss his topics with, since if he touches on these issues with the others, it would be very touch-and-go. The topic of Venezuela, of Cuba, of Haiti’s relations with the Dominican Republic, which is fundamental for the United States. Another important topic is a new General Secretary of the OAS, which I understand is to be chosen in the first half of March. Who will it be, and who the United States supports, and who the countries you mentioned are supporting? In Mexico, we’re waiting to know when there’ll be a meeting between the Mexican foreign secretary and Rubio.
Among the allies Marco Rubio will visit is Panama, where Trump is provoking a conflictive situation. What’s your view of Trump’s pretensions of recovering control of the Panama Canal and its impact on Latin America? Panama has said they’re willing to talk, but not to negotiate the Treaty and the Canal’s sovereignty.
Effectively, it’s a very delicate, very complex visit that Rubio will make to Panama, because while President Mulino has been open to a closer relationship with the United States, he can’t accept Trump’s demand that he return the canal. Rubio’s going to be forced to raise the issue, because the president is talking about it nearly every day. I don’t know exactly how that meeting is going to play out. Under normal conditions, such a meeting would never happen, because it doesn’t make sense.
With the exception of Panama, at least Rubio chose four or five countries where he won’t have any friction, where instead there’ll be agreements on immigration matters. Guatemala has practically already accepted being a “third safe country” – it really doesn’t have any other choice. There are very good relations with El Salvador, and there’ll be good relations with the Dominican Republic.
One important pending topic with the Dominican Republic is the tenth Summit of the Americas, to be held in Punta Cana in December of this year. Will Trump go? Will Rubio go? Will Venezuela go? Will Cuba go? Will both Cuba and Rubio go? How will that play out? Diaz-Canel with Trump? Maduro with Trump? Those are some of the complex topics on the table with the Dominican Republic. So, it’s going to be a very interesting trip, which we’ll have to follow closely.
First published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.