No Sign of Life from Cuba’s Communist Party

By Harold Cardenas Lema (Joven Cuba)

HAVANA TIMES – Judging by the press reports about last the 10th Plenary Session of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, the delegates apparently live in some other country than the Cuba of 2025. While citizen discontent multiplies and material conditions deteriorate, the country’s maximum political authorities meet without transmitting their debates live, in a unanimous chorus of opinions, and without an appropriate sense of urgency. Instead of an instance for deliberation, the Plenary seems more like a symbolic reaffirmation than a tool for agreeing on public policies in a context that’s ever more adverse.

The PCC Central Committee met  on July 4 and 5, and it was an opportunity for the leadership to face the magnitude of the crisis with frankness. They didn’t do it. Despite the economic collapse, the general social discontent, and the loss of confidence in the official discourse, the Party – while it did offer a superficial recognition of these problems – continues looking complacently within, closed into their own formulas, without enough self-criticism or will for structural change.

However, there’s still time. Instead of continuing in its lockdown, the Party could choose another path towards real policymaking. Recover the vocation of representation, dialogue, convincing. But at this critical time, it’s impossible to ignore that it’s chosen not to do so. To top it off, it continues insisting on a discourse that divides Cubans into patriots and enemies, without demonstrating any capacity or interest in governing for all Cubans. That’s the image its critics have historically wanted to give it, and today the Party is reinforcing that of its own volition.

For decades, the Party maintained its authority in a peculiar equilibrium: it wasn’t really democratic, but it wasn’t illegitimate either. Part of its legitimacy came from tangible successes in health, education, and equity, but also from its frontal opposition to an external enemy with little moral credibility in the region – the United States.

Over time, that story began changing. The Special Period [1990s economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union] marked a profound fracture: even so, several of these guarantees were maintained. However, following the departure of Fidel Castro – first for illness, later with his death – the Party was left without its central figure. Since then, the distance between the official discourse and daily life has become impossible to hide.

Today, ever fewer Cubans believe in the Revolutionary epic. The Party no longer embodies a promise for the future. In fact, just the opposite: today, many see it as an obstacle to reaching a better future. And that discredit isn’t only a product of the US embargo and the international context: it’s the direct consequence of a chain of clumsy decisions, the inability to listen, and the systematic denial of the signs of decadence.

The most radical political transformation in Cuba hasn’t happened within the government structures, but in the minds of its people. The exhaustion, the frustration, and the massive emigration are symptoms of a rupture that has already been consummated.

The Party has lost the monopoly of hope. Its narrative no longer defines the present, much less the future. And the most serious thing is that it doesn’t seem to be aware of it. Heir of a political culture that punishes internal criticism, it’s fallen into a dynamic of institutional self-deception, where the problems are disguised with euphemisms and the solution is always “on the way.”

The situation is so serious that in certain areas of the country the Government has retreated to the point where churches and religious communities, previously marginalized or under government watch, fill the vacuum with listening, aid, and sense. These institutions in many cases even maintain conservative agendas contrary to the idea of progress and social rights that have usually been part of the Cuban revolutionary way of thinking. There, in places where the Party no longer arrives, other actors are taking its place, offering what the political system no longer knows how to give: a paradigm for living and resources to get there.

That the Party has lost legitimacy doesn’t imply that the opposition is ready, united or even deserves to replace it. The majority of the dissident figures continue to lack a clear strategy. They often give the impression that they prefer collapse over the construction of viable alternatives.

Government repression isn’t necessarily the chief reason for the opposition’s weakness. There’s inertia among the forces that oppose the Cuban Communist Party. Within Cuba, the opposition needs citizen desperation to make their ranks grow. Outside the country, the most visible exile group continues to be dominated by a political class with dubious democratic credentials and a long history of alignment with authoritarian agendas, as well as a lack of respect for national sovereignty.

More than a democratic project, a good part of the opposition offers nostalgia and revenge. And so, the political vacuum grows.

In his moment, Fidel Castro represented a charismatic and foundational leader. However, nearly a decade after his absence, we’re left with a model dependent on the leader, without a leadership that can support it.

The new generation of leaders neither mobilize nor inspire enthusiasm, and they delegate to the repression what they can’t succeed in doing with politics. Raul Castro, although less charismatic, at least attempted reforms, but his legacy was ensnared in the inertia of the system, the reluctance of some of his contemporaries, and international events beyond his control.

One of the faces most associated with the stagnation is Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, who for years led the Department of Organization and with it the policies of the Party cadres. Many believe that he left an organization without real renewal, without any connection to society, and with no capacity for articulation. Nonetheless, a fair judgement on his person is difficult to make; we may never know how many decisions reflected his own desires, and how many times he was the acting arm of others.

Despite the great cynicism with which the Party could be viewed, we need to mention that there’s also a component of great sacrifice on the part of many of its militants. I’d rather not speculate about the highest leaders – however, at an intermediate and grassroots level, working within the party structures is a thankless vocation that is sustained only by the conviction of those who do it. However, all that sacrifice is worth nothing if those directing the organization don’t lead it in a way that makes it at least moderately competitive with other political options.

The end result of this Plenary session is the impression of a worn-out Party, without the will to make the necessary and urgent decisions that could save it in the eyes of its own people.

In a country where talent is massively emigrating, time advances more quickly than the structures or the thinking of the decision-makers. Technology also threatens to leave the Party behind. The VPNs already form part of digital life on the island, and soon the satellite networks such as Starlink will make the current censorship measures ever more useless. On the other hand, generative artificial intelligence can create fake news, simulated protests, and falsified speeches that generate real reactions in the population.

And in the near future, Artificial Intelligence will allow outsiders to influence moods, interfere in the public discourse, and orchestrate campaigns with surgical precision. For a Party without a decent communications strategy, or capacity to adapt, that’s a verdict, not a risk.

The recently concluded X Plenary Session has left it clear that there won’t be any profound turnaround. But there’s still a margin of opportunity (a narrow one, but real) for the Party to reconnect with society. The question goes beyond economic reforms – it’s a matter of trying to return to genuine political activity: to represent, listen, compete.

The Plenary revealed the exhaustion of the current model. Today, most of the world’s political parties exhibit their internal differences as proof of democratic spirit. Meanwhile, the Communist Party in Cuba – anchored in a false concept of strength – prefers to stifle debate and continue projecting unanimity as unity. The images displayed in the government media highlighted the usual scene of hands raised in unison, in place of a debate on the country’s real problems. The contrast of that echo chamber with an ever more diverse and outraged civil society speaks volumes. The result is a poor and badly rehearsed spectacle, instead of real deliberation.

The government press spoke of “perfecting” the cadre policy. But our reality demands transformation, not marginal adjustments. The accountability report – described as “critical and strictly tied to reality” – was instead a collection of euphemisms. Rather than recognize errors, it spoke of “undesired” rhythms, or “lack of comprehensiveness.”

The President’s closing address was adequate by Party standards. If had taken place a decade ago, it might even have been called daring. But by this point in 2025, it’s left wanting, and very distant from what’s needed. And this is another central problem: the fact that Raul Castro in his moment, and Diaz-Canel now, continue being the ones to demonstrate the greatest critical capacity within the party leadership, says a great deal about the prevailing conservative dynamic. That no other functionary dare point out the problems of the country with acuity reveals a structure concerned more about obedience than lucidity.

In the President’s speech, he appeared to recognize the gravity of this moment, but in Cuba power doesn’t reside only in the upper positions. With structures such as the GAESA (military controlled umbrella enterprise) operating parallel to the government, and the dynamics of invisible power groups, his margin of action is, to say the least, unclear.

Meanwhile, daily life has become unsustainable. The blackouts have succeeded in irritating even the Party militants. And the government has failed, not only with its incapability of offering solutions, but also in explaining the role of the US sanctions in this crisis clearly, and with solid arguments that don’t sound like justifications.

The lack of empathy and self-criticism, added to the failure to recognize the gravity of the situation, are also counterrevolutionary elements, because they deny the fundamental pact of the revolutionary project: to be with the people. And the most tragic aspect is that even if they wanted to change, the Party seems not to know how, what to do differently, or where to begin.

Postscript

It’s too late for the Party to build the society it dreamed of. The context has changed, and the people are too disillusioned. The ideas of the right are winning terrain in the hearts and minds of Cubans – not because of their virtues, but for the emptiness left by a Party that proclaims itself the vanguard of the left, yet has lost the impulse to change what should have been changed a long time ago. Even though the Communist Party continues in power, we’re already living in a post-revolutionary Cuba. Administering the changes that take place, in order to mitigate the damage and recover some degree of credibility, would require a Party radically different from the one we saw in this gathering.

And that’s a tragedy. Many people’s blood was spilled, and even today many others are sacrificing their lives for a revolutionary dream that is being squandered in the hands of an apparatus that no longer measures up. History reminds us what happened in the Soviet Union. It wasn’t the people who failed there, but their leaders. The people, when they have a voice, tend to be right.

If the Communist Party of Cuba doesn’t change, history won’t absolve it. It will simply stop judging it, because – in that case – the Party will no longer matter. Not as a power, nor as a symbol.

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First published in Spanish by Joven Cuba and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.

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