Cuba’s Dilemma: Resistance, Collapse or Negotiation?
under Trump’s oil siege
Rafael Rojas: there are sectors proposing a return to the reformist agenda, but the official response is to “close ranks” with the Government.
By Carlos F. Chamorro (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES — Cuban historian Rafael Rojas, researcher and professor at El Colegio de México, believes that given the worsening crisis Cuba is facing under the oil siege imposed by Donald Trump and reinforced by the executive order of January 29, 2026, “migratory pressure toward a mass exodus, or a social explosion, are within the realm of reasonable expectations of what could happen in the coming weeks and months.”
“If there is a social explosion, one would expect the Cuban Government’s habitual way of reacting with repression and orders for mass arrests and imprisonments. In that case, the possibility of an (US) intervention becomes more tangible,” he warned.
In a conversation with the program Esta Semana, broadcast on CONFIDENCIAL’s YouTube channel due to television censorship in Nicaragua, Rojas analyzed different scenarios for overcoming the crisis of Cuba’s revolutionary model, after 67 years of wear and tear and now under “maximum pressure” from the Trump Administration.
Cuba has proposed dialogue with the United States to expand cooperation on issues tied to Trump’s hemispheric security strategy (illegal migration, counternarcotics, terrorism, security). But it is not ruled out that, in exchange for economic cooperation and suspension of the embargo, the United States would demand profound political changes in the “Cuban model” — something Havana has never been willing to consider.
Between these two options — which could lead to regime collapse or capitulation — a sector of Cuban society proposes resuming a political and economic reform agenda postponed since 2011. But the hardline wing of the Communist Party and the military, Rojas says, demands “closing ranks” with Miguel Diaz-Canel’s Government and instead imposing a “counter-reform.”
Cuba was already going through a severe energy crisis since last year. What impact has the closing of the Venezuelan oil spigot — imposed by the United States — and Trump’s executive order threatening tariffs on countries exporting oil to Cuba had on the economy and daily life?
Trump’s executive order of January 29 adds to a depression in Cuba’s economic and social indicators that has been unfolding since 2021, when that social explosion occurred — a series of mass protests across the island.
Since then, there has been an enormous drop in productivity and GDP, shortages of basic food and medicines, inflation, a fall in the real minimum wage, impoverishment, rising inequality, and worsening living conditions.
The executive order comes in the context of the suspension of Venezuelan oil subsidies after the US military operation in Caracas on January 3. The decline of Venezuelan subsidies over the last five years even led Mexico to replace Venezuela as Cuba’s main fuel supplier last year.
What is the situation right now? What oil reserves does Cuba have before a total paralysis occurs?
Energy specialists on Cuba, such as Professor Jorge Piñón, argue that Cuba has domestic fuel production sufficient to supply up to 40% of the infrastructure and economic needs.
President Miguel Díaz-Canel said on February 5 that there has been no external oil supply since December. However, in Mexico there was talk of shipments during the first 15 days of January. In the last month, the Cuban Government has been self-supplying oil at that pace it produces.
What is under debate is the concept of collapse. Cuban economists, sociologists, and demographers — especially amid rising mass emigration — have used that concept for years, since the 2021 protests. But now collapse refers to national paralysis due to energy shortages. That said, total paralysis would never occur, because the Government could endure with self-supply, although 40% or below.
This crisis is also hitting tourism, especially Canadian tourism, which represents over 60% of visitors. How do blackouts, transportation limits, and access to basic services affect daily life?
The economic model consolidated in the first quarter of the 21st century — built on the collaboration scheme between Venezuela and Cuba promoted by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez and rests on external oil subsidies and the concentration of development planning on tourism and family remittances.
Maintaining either income stream requires, on the one hand, oil subsidies, and on the other, good relations with the United States so sanctions don’t affect remittances.
Both income sources — tourism and remittances — are now severely affected. The Cuban State faces the possibility of revenue shortages which, combined with oil supply problems, limit not only international financial transactions but the functioning of economic and social life.
One of the sectors immediately impacted by this energy blockade that Cuba is experiencing is electricity services, but also health services, education, water supply, so that hospitals, schools, companies, factories, and public transport can function.
Compared with past crises — the 1962 Missile Crisis, the 1990s “Special Period,” the 2021 protests — what does today represent with the loss of Venezuelan subsidies and the new aggressive policy of the Trump administration?
A widely used comparison has been with the “Special Period” and the “zero option” of the 1990s, when the US embargo coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialism — Cuba’s main sugar buyers.
The difference is that Cuba was then a major global sugar producer for socialist markets. Today it has no comparable export commodity.
What Cuba can offer amid energy shortages is tourism and remittances — both directly impacted by escalating tensions with Trump’s Government.
In one week, the United States has effectively become the only solution for stable energy supply and sustained remittance flows from Cubans in that country.
Trump has fueled speculation about negotiations with Cuba. Is there evidence? Is there any evidence of negotiations? And if so, what would the United States be seeking?
I’ve seen no concrete reports confirming negotiations.
What we have heard are statements from Deputy Cuban Foreign Minister Carlos Fernandez de Cossío about conversations and message exchanges at high levels.
Cuba has offered greater collaboration with the US on hemispheric security: drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal migration in the Greater Caribbean, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, maritime and border security.
Such cooperation has existed before, but now Havana is offering to expand it — while also calling for global solidarity, drawing analogies between Cuba and Gaza to generate international media and ideological impact.
At the same time, domestic discourse emphasizes sacrifice, revolutionary intransigence, and refusal to negotiate under pressure or political conditions.
The United States is moving in the direction of issues, Cuba points out, that coincide with its anti-immigration policy, deportations, drug trafficking and also rare minerals, or is the promotion of political change, or regime change in Cuba, also part of its agenda?
We don’t know — that’s part of the uncertainty. Marco Rubio has spoken favorably about regime change but insists the US would not directly pursue it. He has said lifting the embargo would require regime change — but that it’s not on the immediate agenda for the United States.
Still, it’s difficult to separate this maximum pressure strategy from expectations of another social explosion like 2021, potentially leading to some form of intervention. The possibility can’t be ignored.
Given this increased pressure, the shortages, and the possibility of social unrest, there is no clarity regarding the United States’ agenda for negotiations or regime change.
I imagine that if this offer from the Cuban Foreign Ministry to expand cooperation on security issues in the Greater Caribbean is received positively by some sectors of the Trump administration, but other things would be demanded in return. The Trump administration is currently in a position to offer what Cuba needs most: energy supplies. But, naturally, in exchange, it would demand other things, beyond the deepening of hemispheric security cooperation offered by Havana.
From the Cuban regime’s perspective, profound political and economic reforms to address the crisis of the Cuban model have been discarded or postponed in recent decades and were never implemented. Are these postponed reforms among the options available to the Cuban regime today or is its only remaining option to resist or capitulate?
We don’t know either. In recent weeks, reformist groups on the island, especially those comprised of economists, sociologists, and demographers, have relaunched their reform projects on various digital platforms. They propose reviving the reformist path, which is well-defined at different levels. Some are more radical or profound within academia, while others were accepted by Raul Castro’s government between 2011 and 2016, precisely when diplomatic normalization began with Barack Obama. Later, a Communist Party plenary session was held where the entire reformist project was reversed.
These reformist sectors—diplomats, politicians, and those involved in the Cuban economy and trade—are proposing a return to that reformist agenda. The response from the more ideological wing of the Cuban bureaucracy is that accepting reforms now is a capitulation and that the current priority is to close ranks with the Diaz-Canel government and maintain the counter-reformist line. In fact, a new development plan has just been launched, following the same counter-reformist line as in recent years. The Cuban government’s response to the possibility of using reform as a bargaining chip is to oppose that option.
Where do the Cuban people stand in this crisis? Is a mass exodus or migration likely if there is no solution? Are there possibilities of new protests resulting from the massive blackouts and lack of access to services, or does the regime have support for its strategy of resistance and refusal to surrender?
Both mass exodus pressure and social explosion are reasonable expectations in coming months.
In the case of the mass exodus, there are a number of new restrictions that did not exist in the 1990s, during the Special Period and the Zero Option policy, nor in the early decades of the 21st century when the previous attempts at mass maritime exodus occurred. The laws in the United States today are different; they are restrictive laws against illegal immigration by sea. And the other irregular migration routes by land—journeys through Nicaragua, Ecuador, other Central American countries, and Mexico to reach the US border—are also being closed. There was a recent decision by the Ortega government to require visas for potential Cuban migrants.
That visa-free route enabled thousands of Cubans to migrate after the 2021 protests. As these routes close, the likelihood of social unrest increases.
How have Cubans reacted to Nicaragua’s suspension of visa-free travel? In a column you wrote and we published in CONFIDENCIAL, you say that Daniel Ortega is showing solidarity with Donald Trump. Why?
Ironically, Nicaragua’s decision aligns with Trump and Rubio’s push to restrict irregular migration from Cuba, Venezuela, and Haiti through Central America and Mexico. In that sense, it must have been well received by the Trump Administration — hence the ironic “solidarity.”
Mexico, as you mentioned, and Chile as well, are calling for humanitarian aid for Cuba. But what is the scope of this humanitarian crisis? Is it a temporary situation brought on by the oil embargo, or a structural problem?
The collapse has been mentioned in analyses of the deterioration of economic and social indicators in Cuba since 2021 and 2022. There’s another term used by academics on the island: polycrisis. They call it that because it’s a structural crisis in every sense—economic, social, political, related to external and internal income, and budgetary. Clearly, it has been brewing for years and is now reaching its climax with the oil embargo, or perhaps not entirely, because it remains to be seen how long the Cuban government can survive with 40% or less of the country’s energy needs and their call to resistance.
But indeed, the humanitarian crisis is not new, although it is clearly worsening now. What I observe as new is that Cuba’s international relations with left-leaning Latin American governments are based on the recognition of a humanitarian crisis. In other words, Cuba is no longer presented in governments like Claudia Sheinbaum’s in Mexico, Lula’s in Brazil, Orsi’s in Uruguay, or Boric’s in Chile as a model, as a symbol of revolution and socialism, but rather as a country experiencing a humanitarian crisis, much like the Haitian case has been presented for decades.
While there are clearly a number of emotional and ideological elements linked to the historical experience of the Cuban Revolution and its role in the region that contribute to this diagnosis of a humanitarian crisis, this also leads to a difference in terms of solidarity. Boric’s government acknowledges this by insisting that humanitarian aid should not flow directly from the Chilean government to the Cuban government but rather must be channeled through international organizations like UNICEF. In contrast, President Sheinbaum, I believe to appease the pro-Cuba base of the ruling Morena party, is advocating for a type of humanitarian aid through bilateral government-to-government relations.
During the US military intervention in Venezuela on January 3rd, 32 Cuban officers and soldiers died in military actions. What impact did this have on Cuba, and what is happening with the Cuban military and security presence in Venezuela? Is it still there, have they withdrawn, or is it also a matter of negotiation with the United States?
The deaths of those 32 Cuban soldiers in the January 3rd operation in Caracas were treated as a matter of mourning by the Cuban government. Funeral honors were held on the island for at least a week, and the official Cuban press was heavily focused on this grief before shifting to different strategies.
Something that wasn’t immediately noticeable, but which has since begun to gain traction on official Cuban social media, is a negative perception of how Delcy Rodríguez’s government is conducting its negotiations with the United States; the term “betrayal” is sometimes used. Overall, a highly critical and negative perception is prevailing, which also includes the perceived coldness with which Delcy Rodriguez’s government has handled the matter of these 32 Cuban soldiers killed in Caracas.
I lack firsthand information on ongoing military collaboration, but I would expect accelerated deterioration — as seen already in healthcare, education, and sports cooperation.
How long can this crisis last? I suppose that from Cuba’s perspective they want to see it through the midterm elections in the United States, but, on the other hand, Trump has many tools at his disposal to exert pressure on Cuba.
Indeed, I believe that is the Cuban government’s strategy: to hold out until November and hope that an unfavorable outcome in the US midterm elections for Trump, and a subsequent reshuffling of Congress, will lead to a reversal of the January 29th executive order and a change in the climate of extreme hostility that has prevailed in recent months.
That is the Cuban government’s strategy, and between now and November, this entire solidarity campaign with Cuba will attempt to gain as much traction as possible within the Democratic Party networks in the United States. Perhaps we will see something in these months that has more or less always occurred, but not with such force or emphasis as now: Cuban intervention in a US electoral process—that is, Cuba trying to place the island’s cause on the Democrats’ electoral agenda for these November elections.
Is a US-induced crisis in Cuba possible? I suppose the US has to weigh the consequences of causing a collapse in Cuba?
It’s very risky for the Trump administration. It has low approval ratings, and there are very unfavorable projections for Trump and the Republican Party heading into the November elections. But anything can happen if there’s any serious outbreak of either of the two reactions I mentioned earlier: a social explosion, with the Cuban government’s usual response of repression, arrest warrants, and mass imprisonments. The other being a mass exodus. In that case, the possibility of intervention becomes much more real.
When the military intervention in Venezuela occurred, many expected a different kind of reaction, both from the Venezuelan Armed Forces and from the supposed political support enjoyed by the Maduro regime. In the case of Cuba, what would the population’s reaction be? Does the pressure from the United States generate any support for the regime?
Both things. There’s a segment of the population, very critical youth sectors, social media activists who are taking a very strong stance against the government and are being repressed, arrested, convicted, and sentenced to years in prison. There’s also evangelical activism mobilizing against the government. This entire critical segment of Cuban society, especially the younger generations, which has been gaining ground for years now, again since the social uprising of 2021, in its challenge to and questioning of the Cuban government and will intensify in the coming weeks.
However, there are also more traditional sectors that will reaffirm their identification with the government under this new climate of hostility. Both things. And I suppose that the decisive sectors, the military bodies involved in security, are also experiencing a similar division. Perhaps not as in the case of the young people challenging the government, but rather one sector more in favor of reviving the reformist project, and another making common cause with the government.
First published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.