Maduro’s Dictatorship, and the Threat of War in Venezuela
As Trump ups the ante
Boris Muñoz: In the cloud of information, what stands out is that the US will launch military actions to weaken the regime, seeking “an internal rupture.”
By Carlos F. Chamorro (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES – Seven weeks after the United States announced its supposed anti-drug operation in the Venezuelan Caribbean, a naval and air military deployment of 4,000 Marines remains in place, aimed at the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela.
In an article published in El País, titled “The Venezuelan Dilemma: Negotiate Before the Bombs Decide,” Venezuelan journalist Boris Muñoz describes a country trapped in limbo. On the one hand, a full-scale military invasion is unlikely, but limited military actions to weaken the regime are considered imminent. On the other, no political negotiation seems possible between Maduro and Trump, while the opposition led by María Corina Machado remains aligned with the US strategy to secure recognition of Edmundo Gonzalez, the elected president and winner of the July 28, 2024 elections.
In a conversation on Esta Semana, broadcast on Confidencial’s YouTube channel due to television censorship in Nicaragua, Muñoz refuses to make predictions about a conflict unfolding in “the fog of war.”
In Venezuela, Muñoz summarizes, “one must take a considerable risk to bring about change. Otherwise, the alternative is the continued rule of the Maduro government, which has already caused enough havoc across the region. Latin America must look at itself and ask: what can we do to end this situation in the best possible way—producing regime change?”
After the sinking of three boats allegedly carrying Venezuelan drug traffickers in international waters, the United States has increased its military presence and even declared war on cartels it defines as “international non-state actors.”
How does the Maduro regime interpret the continued and growing U.S. military pressure?
BORIS MUÑOZ: The regime is deeply concerned. It has tried to reopen unofficial talks through Rick Grenell, Trump’s special envoy for Venezuela. It has also taken steps to tighten internal control of drug trafficking to undercut the pretexts the Trump administration is using for this siege.
This began about seven weeks ago, with naval and now air deployments in Puerto Rico and Caribbean waters, involving more than 4,000 Marines and other forces. As Trump’s rhetoric has intensified, the Maduro government has made moves—even in Qatar—to explore possible dialogue or commitments that might save it from direct US military action on Venezuelan soil. I don’t mean an invasion, because there’s been clear emphasis in Washington that it wouldn’t be one. Rather, it would consist of strikes targeting drug-trafficking-related objectives.
But it’s all quite confusing, because this military buildup is being used to target the Maduro government directly. Maduro has been named head of the Cartel of the Suns and leader of El Tren de Aragua, and the bounty on his head has been raised to US $50 million. One doesn’t have to read between the lines to see that this points directly at Maduro—whether as deterrence or as a prelude to military action in the coming weeks, as several outlets have reported.
Maduro continues increasing militarization and preparing for supposed military confrontation. What is the mood among chavistas (government supporters) and ordinary Venezuelans? Are they preparing for a prolonged crisis or a quick strike?
People are expecting a surgical strike. I don’t have official data—just accounts from friends and family—describing an atmosphere of skepticism. The end of the Maduro regime has been announced so many times that people prefer to take everything “with a grain of salt.”
In fact, there was a controversial New York Times report last Sunday that was heavily criticized for portraying the militias’ level of commitment, while hinting that there are internal problems within the Venezuelan government. The fact that the regime allowed a major outlet like the Times to conduct even a mild investigation shows a shift—an attempt to open a window to the outside world amid its deep isolation.
That’s significant. Across Latin America, there’s been little noise—few voices—speaking out against this imminent action. Not since the 1989 invasion of Panama—widely regarded as a US “success”—have we seen such a major military deployment in the region.
Although this is officially an anti-drug operation, it’s increasingly clear—even from the US narrative—that it’s an operation against Maduro. Is it directed at Nicolas Maduro himself, or at the political-military elite that sustains the regime? Has this pressure created unity or fractures within the ruling elite?
I think it has created more unity. So far, we haven’t seen any cracks. But in reality, nothing significant has happened inside Venezuelan territory yet. The bombed boats were in international waters. Seventeen people are believed to have died—a tragic event—but there hasn’t been a direct attack on the regime. Everything remains, as experts say, within “the fog of war.”
It’s a complex picture. If you listen to opposition figures, there’s clear alignment between María Corina Machado’s position and US actions. The expectation—especially on social media and among Venezuelans in Florida—is that the Maduro dictatorship will fall within weeks.
Some say there will be “Bin Laden-style” strikes—an extraction or elimination of Maduro’s inner circle. Others speak of up to 600 military targets in Venezuela linked to drug trafficking. Amid all this information haze, the loudest message is that the US will carry out actions aimed at weakening the Maduro regime to trigger an internal collapse—something long discussed but never realized.
I don’t know if that is going to happen. If US forces do engage—not through invasion or occupation, but through targeted strikes—it could indeed provoke a break and regime change. Venezuela simply lacks the military capacity to respond to US power.
This alignment between the Venezuelan opposition—led by María Corina Machado and presumably President-elect Edmundo González—must heighten regime hostility. Could opposition leaders still inside Venezuela face more persecution?
Without doubt. The ongoing persecution adds to what already existed. Several activists from Vente Venezuela, María Corina Machado’s party, have been arrested in recent weeks. Diosdado Cabello, who oversees repression, has intensified surveillance and fear.
For the opposition, this is an extremely high-stakes gamble—perhaps a final attempt to overthrow the regime and secure recognition of Gonzalez’s 2024 electoral victory, which the regime fraudulently denied. Their goal is to have González recognized and sworn in as the legitimate president of Venezuela.
Machado has said her objective isn’t to be president but to liberate Venezuela. She sees herself as the vector of that liberation—made possible through her alliance with the Trump administration, particularly with Marco Rubio.
Between non-invasion and maximum military pressure, could escalation or direct clashes occur between the two countries’ militaries? What might be the consequences?
Domestically, the regime is reinforcing social control. By mobilizing militias and arming civilians—though it’s unclear how extensively—it’s sending a signal to prevent any uprising that would be costly and hard to contain.
If military conflict occurs, the toll would almost certainly be worse for Venezuela. US military power would inflict far greater losses on Venezuelans.
Trump, for his part, has built his political brand as someone who avoids high-casualty military interventions. That’s what he sells to his MAGA base. So, this shift—toward limited, low-cost military action—would be politically advantageous if it leads to regime change in Venezuela.
All of this contributes to a dense fog—hard to see through—but among opposition circles, there’s near certainty that something will unfold within weeks.
If this U.S. military pressure leads to a rupture and allows the opposition to take power—Edmundo Gonzalez as president—would Venezuela be governable?
That’s an extremely tough question. Venezuela is full of illicit and armed actors: Colombian guerrillas turned narco-groups, mineral traffickers, criminal gangs, and government-linked colectivos. The country is awash in weapons; controlling that won’t be easy.
The opposition has a carefully prepared transition and control plan that would allow it to assume power. Still, it’s risky to speculate. Personally, I think some degree of risk must be accepted to achieve change. Otherwise, the alternative is Maduro’s continued rule—something many, both inside and outside Venezuela, mistakenly sell as a “stabilizing” factor. We know the opposite is true: Maduro’s regime has already wreaked havoc across the region.
This is a moment for Latin America to ask: What can we do to ensure this ends in the best possible way—with regime change? There should be action, but none is visible yet.
What about Maduro’s international allies—Iran, China, Russia? They issue diplomatic statements, but do they really matter in this crisis?
I don’t think so. Perhaps Russia—to some extent—because it supplies Venezuelan weapons: Sukhoi warplanes and Kalashnikov rifles. But Russia is overstretched and drained by its costly war in Ukraine. Iran was recently defeated militarily by the US, and China avoids military entanglements; its economic interests elsewhere, especially in Brazil, are far more significant than anything in Venezuela.
So Maduro stands largely alone. The regime lives off its image—its cultivated aura of military might over 25 years—but that’s unlikely to sustain even a brief confrontation with the world’s most powerful military.
Some Venezuelan leaders and US politicians close to Marco Rubio have predicted this crisis could end before Christmas. Is that realistic?
That’s the central political question. Next year (2026), the US will hold crucial midterm elections for Trump’s project. If he becomes bogged down in a prolonged conflict—a war quagmire—it could reduce his chances.
Still, many Venezuelans are betting they’ll eat hallacas in Caracas this December. I don’t know how realistic that hope is or how close we are to fulfilling it. But they say Trump has several intervention scenarios on his desk—and that whatever happens must be low-cost and short-term.
I, however, wouldn’t dare make a prediction.
First published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.