Venezuela Between the Military Threats of Trump and Maduro
“The People Feel Abandoned”
Carolina Jimenez and David Smilde: “The tragedy is that both Maduro and the opposition see Trump as a way to stay in power, or to obtain it.”
By Carlos F. Chamorro (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES – The “war games” of the Trump Administration against Nicolas Maduro’s dictatorship have drawn international attention to the US military strategy and its theory that increasing military pressure will provoke an internal rupture and regime change with Maduro’s departure.
Sociologist David Smilde, a professor at Tulane University and an expert on Venezuela and US–Venezuelan relations for three decades, calls this theory “too simplistic.” He argues that within the upper ranks of the Maduro government “there is still an ideology and a sense of self-preservation among those who have their hands in illicit economies, fear justice, and believe their only security lies with chavismo,” and that “Maduro does everything possible to convince them there will be a witch hunt, keeping the Armed Forces united.”
For her part, Venezuelan human rights advocate Carolina Jiménez, president of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), believes that “Venezuela’s tragic dilemma is being trapped as a country in a strategy from both sides — the Maduro regime and the opposition led by Maria Corina Machado — who see the Trump Administration as the way to stay in power or to seize power.”
In a conversation on the program Esta Semana, broadcast on Confidencial’s YouTube channel due to TV censorship in Nicaragua, Smilde and Jimenez examined the “gray zones” of Venezuela’s crisis following the electoral fraud against Edmundo González after the opposition victory of July 28, 2024, and described a Venezuelan people “desperate and abandoned” amid a severe humanitarian crisis.
So far, 17 attacks have been carried out in international waters against boats allegedly belonging to drug traffickers, leaving 66 unidentified dead. Are these anti-narcotics operations, acts of war, or extrajudicial executions?
Carolina Jiménez: Sadly, the number has increased, because this morning (November 7, 2025) we woke up to news of another attack in the Caribbean Sea, in international waters, bringing the total to 70. We are in the painful task of having to add more dead to the list.
When a state takes the law into its own hands under the pretext of fighting drug trafficking — bombing boats that show no resistance or threat — and we see no attempt at capture or interception, only the immediate use of lethal force, all minimal use-of-force protocols are violated. The shift from legal, proportional, moderate force to lethal force means we are clearly witnessing extrajudicial executions under international law.
We at WOLA said this from day one; other international organizations have said so as well, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has also stated it. There is a consensus within the human rights and international community that these are grave violations of international human rights law.
The United States has deployed about ten ships, including a submarine, and thousands of soldiers around the Caribbean waters of Venezuela. Soon, the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford, the largest and most modern in the US fleet, may join them. What is the goal of this military deployment? Is it really about fighting drugs, or is there another political objective?
David Smilde: There are multiple motivations. The stated justification is the fight against drug trafficking — but that makes little sense. Venezuela is not one of the main sources of cocaine entering the United States. Much of the cocaine passing through Venezuela goes to Europe; only 10 to 15 percent goes through Venezuela to the US, most of that comes through the Pacific.
What’s really hitting US cities is fentanyl — and that doesn’t come from Venezuela; it comes from Mexico, from precursors imported from China. So, the narcotics justification doesn’t hold up.
Meanwhile, Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State and also National Security Advisor, has long sought regime change in Venezuela. So there’s that motivation, especially among political actors in South Florida. Rubio has essentially rebranded a regime-change operation as a drug war, using anti-terrorism language for Trump — and, of course, Trump campaigned on this. He promised to bomb the cartels, which plays well with his base. With Trump, almost everything is theater.
The United States has said it is preparing ground attacks in Venezuela under the pretext of destroying the drug flow, and it doesn’t rule out attacks on military bases it considers part of the cartels. What consequences could ground attacks in Venezuelan territory have?
Carolina Jiménez: First, we’d have to consider the consequences inside the United States itself. It would be a grave violation of domestic law, since such actions should require Congressional approval — yet these attacks are happening without it. We’d see a serious overreach of executive power.
In Venezuela, it would be uncharted territory. In Latin America we haven’t seen this kind of attack for decades, and it would be extremely serious for any Latin American country if the US violated its sovereignty and caused civilian casualties.
Venezuelans want a transition to democracy — July 28, 2024, was clear proof of that. Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia won the elections overwhelmingly, peacefully, through the vote. Sadly, that will was disregarded and violently repressed.
But that does not mean Venezuelans want bombs on their territory. One of the gravest concerns is civilian deaths, and we must remember Venezuela has various armed groups — the infamous colectivos, paramilitary groups, and a complex, co-opted military structure. No one knows how they would react. When you play with gunpowder, it can explode — this is an extremely dangerous scenario.
The increasingly overt goal of this military pressure — short of invasion — is to weaken Maduro’s regime, provoke internal fractures, and force him out. But given the regime’s nature — an alliance of civic, military, and economic elites — some analysts doubt this US premise. Is it realistic to think military pressure could topple Maduro?
David Smilde: I’m one of those who question that strategy. The Venezuelan opposition has long claimed that the regime is weak. There’s discontent — an overwhelming majority voted against it. But after the July 28 election, I was surprised that there were virtually no defections. In 2017, more people broke away from the regime.
They still see themselves as revolutionaries in an anti-imperialist struggle. There’s unity among them and a strong sense of self-preservation among those tied to illicit economies who fear justice. Maduro works hard to keep them united by convincing them there will be a witch hunt.
The main theory behind this intervention is that Maduro heads a drug cartel — the “Cartel of the Suns,” referring to military officers. But if they’re already labeled drug traffickers, what incentive do generals have to turn on him? It’s almost as if Maduro himself benefits from that narrative to ensure the military’s loyalty. Thinking that pressure alone will break the regime is simplistic. Even a targeted strike or “extraction” of Maduro would not guarantee transition — it could just lead to reorganization within chavismo, maybe worse than now. There’s a very naïve sociology of power behind that theory, that such pressure will break the regime.
Where does the opposition led by María Corina Machado stand now? Is it part of the US military-pressure strategy, or does it have autonomy?
Carolina Jiménez: María Corina Machado has publicly supported the US strategy from day one. She has expressed that support repeatedly. President-elect Edmundo Gonzalez, however, has maintained a more moderate, Europe-focused stance, representing a more centrist leadership. Recently he met with dissident chavistas, including former Chavez ministers, signaling that his political project is open to those who once supported Chavez. That’s an encouraging message — suggesting that a transition would not mean a witch hunt. So there are two message coming from those leaders.
However, internationally, Machado remains the best-known figure. She led the 2024 campaign and even received the Nobel Peace Prize. She has been very clear in her support for the US approach.
The New York Times reported that Maduro has been sending messages to Trump offering to grant US companies the oil and mineral concessions previously given to Russian and Chinese firms. The great tragedy, as Jimenez puts it, is that both the de facto government and the opposition are trying by every means to keep Trump’s attention and backing. Maduro promises Trump that if allowed to rule unbothered with his repression and illegitimacy, he will hand over those concessions to US firms. Meanwhile, Machado believes that without credible threats or military pressure, she cannot break the ruling coalition. It’s a tragic dilemma: a country trapped between two sides that both see the Trump Administration as their path to power.
Does the Trump Administration have a political timeline for influencing Venezuela’s crisis? Can it keep this going indefinitely, or will it have to act soon?
David Smilde: The Trump Administration is already showing signs of wear. Polls in recent weeks show most Americans oppose attacking Venezuela. In the latest elections (New York, Virginia, New Jersey), Trump-backed candidates lost badly — a serious blow. Trump can call unfavorable polls “fake news,” but election results are harder to dismiss.
This coincides with reports that Trump is having doubts about launching any operation in Venezuela. The Gerald Ford carrier left the Mediterranean and has been stationary off Morocco for two days.
All this suggests fatigue with the operation. Trump may be hesitating — though he’s also a master at keeping everyone off-balance. Every few days the signals change: imminent attack? backing off? That’s Trump’s method. The more the American public learns about this operation, the less support it has. Opinion pieces and analyses over the past three weeks have been overwhelmingly negative. The longer it drags on, the less likely an attack becomes.
Where does Latin America stand in this crisis and the US policy of using force in international waters and potentially Venezuelan territory? Is it a passive spectator, or is this due to internal divisions in today’s Latin America?
Carolina Jiménez: Historically, Latin America has jointly rejected U.S. interventions, but today there’s a lot of silence. Trump has shown he punishes dissent — tariffs have been his tool for coercing the region. That’s shaped how governments speak out (or not).
Also, Trump chose his enemy well: Maduro is deeply unpopular in Latin America. Only a few, like Colombia’s Gustavo Petro, have voiced support; Lula has said these military attacks in the Caribbean and Pacific are illegal, though in moderate terms. Maduro’s government is diplomatically isolated, and few countries recognized his 2024 “victory” — everyone knows it was blatant fraud.
That doesn’t mean they don’t know the US is breaking international law — but it’s hard to publicly support Maduro, and even harder to stand with the Venezuelan people without going through him.
Maria Corina Machado has repeatedly said that if this policy succeeds and Maduro falls, Cuba and Nicaragua will be next. Are these Venezuelan “war games” a testing ground for US policy toward those regimes?
David Smilde: That’s certainly Marco Rubio’s motivation — he believes Cuba has survived thanks to Venezuela, and if democracy returns to Venezuela, it will come to Cuba and Nicaragua next. But again, that’s simplistic. Cuba has been around for over 60 years. One shouldn’t underestimate the elite’s capacity — with control of economic and military resources — to keep the population subdued.
How exactly would Venezuela’s fall lead to Cuba’s? Venezuela’s support for Cuba today is minimal. Cuban leaders have shown total indifference to their people’s suffering. I don’t see a popular revolt coming or the military withdrawing support. So how would this domino effect actually work? Cuba has resisted for decades, and Nicaragua is in the same position — an authoritarian government willing to do anything to stay in power. You can topple a regime militarily, but what follows is always uncertain. That’s the problem — it doesn’t change the underlying dynamics.
Returning to Venezuela — if direct intervention isn’t on Trump’s agenda, and military pressure won’t bring regime change, where does that leave the majority who voted against Maduro and for Gonzalez, only to have the election stolen?
Carolina Jiménez: It’s the question we all have. After July 28, 2024, one of the Maduro regime’s main strategies has been the sustained increase in repression—and this exemplary repression cannot be underestimated—and the surveillance system. They’ve just revived an app so people can report what their neighbors or friends are doing that might be dangerous to the nation. Well, you in Nicaragua know this very well; it’s also very well known in Cuba.
This tightens the screws considerably, tears apart the social fabric, but further increases censorship in the country. Never before had a woman won the Nobel Peace Prize. You may have many differences with María Corina Machado, but you can’t deny that it was national news, and the only three radio announcers who reported the news are now “on vacation.”
The society that voted against Maduro hasn’t stopped demanding peaceful change, but it’s demoralized under repression and censorship. Yet that spirit expressed on July 28, 2024, isn’t dead — there will be other opportunities for it to resurface. Still, these are very hard times: one in three Venezuelans faces food insecurity; most people worry about putting bread on the table and sending children to school when so many teachers have fled or can’t teach daily. Such realities drain any society’s political energy and shape how it can resist authoritarianism.
If military pressure won’t bring change, Trump won’t invade, and the Venezuelan people are crushed, it seems this crisis may drag on indefinitely.
David Smilde: The Venezuelan people are in an utterly sad, desperate situation. They voted with their hearts, under unjust conditions, and still won — only to be robbed. For a month, presidents from Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico made statements. After that, nothing. Venezuelans feel abandoned.
This is a lesson: if the so-called “progressive” governments that could have acted didn’t, and the world forgets a population in despair, that opens space for Trump. I know many people — not militarists, even former chavistas — who now hope for a US invasion because they’re desperate. They feel Trump is the only one who cares.
There will be future moments — elections, organization, politics — but that requires renewed international, multilateral engagement with Venezuela, from the region and the European Union, not just the United States. The world must return to seeking a solution for the Venezuelan people, who are in despair.
First published in Spanish by Havana Times and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.