Vietnam Acquires 2,000 Hectares in Artemisa, Cuba
to produce soy, sweet potato, taro, and green beans
As Cuban agriculture produces less each year the government hopes that under Vietnamese management the trend can be reversed.
HAVANA TIMES – Vietnam alternates between generosity and business—although much more is said about the former than the latter. On Monday, media outlets in the Southeast Asian country and on the Island made public the results of the 65 Years of Vietnam-Cuba Solidarity campaign, which they claim raised 12.1 million dollars—400% more than the minimum target of 2.6 million.
Meanwhile, it remains unknown how much money is involved in the new contract signed by Artemisa’s Agroforestry Business Group (Geaf) and Vietnam’s Viet Royal International Foods Company “for the cultivation and export of agricultural products,” as announced this weekend by the provincial press.
El Artemiseño, the local official publication, partially reported on the agreement, signed by Nguyen Khac Hoang, director of the Vietnamese company, and his Cuban counterpart Miguel Sanchez Garcia. The deal will unfold in several stages, including the “launch of production” on 2,000 hectares of idle land in Alquízar, San Antonio de los Baños, and San Cristobal. In this area, the main crops will be soy, peanuts, sweet potato, taro, and potatoes—destined for the domestic market, including oil production and animal feed—as well as green beans and cashews, which are intended for export.
The Vietnamese side committed to providing machinery, initial supplies, fertilizers, personnel, and working capital—similar to what has already been done in Pinar del Río, where the Cuban government leased land to a Vietnamese company for rice cultivation. So far, the results there have been very satisfactory, according to both sides. Meanwhile, the Cuban company contributes the land, factories and warehouses, labor, and management of operational processes, according to state media.
Of note is that Cuba also pledged to supply the fuel for the machinery—a resource extremely scarce on the Island and one of the main causes of the chronic lack of productivity. Marketing will be handled jointly by both companies.
The official newspaper devoted several paragraphs to talking about “the commercial ties that unite Artemisa with the sister province of Binh Duong in Vietnam” and with other foreign countries but provided no specifics. Jorge Luis Oramas Vargas, head of the Department of Domestic Trade, Foreign Investment and Economic Collaboration of the provincial government, mentioned that Viet Royal’s director had suggested “building ties with other territories of his country to develop vital sectors such as livestock,” but so far, there is nothing more than words.
“Artemisa is seriously engaged in foreign trade, foreign investment, and international cooperation activities, with a notable focus on agricultural development,” said the Cuban official. He claimed that there are 17 international cooperation projects in areas such as agriculture, health, culture, and sports, “with important results thanks to foreign financing.” However, he did not back up his statements with data on what results have been achieved, which countries are involved, or how the cooperation is carried out—though, in any case, the population has seen no benefit.
He also mentioned the 68 projects the province has ready for foreign investment, but success in this field is clearly nonexistent. Although the figures are outdated, up to 2024—ten years after the foreign investment law came into effect—Cuba had approved 334 businesses and 172 international economic association contracts. The total value was estimated at 3.5 billion dollars, barely a billion more than the government had hoped to secure per year.
Even so, Oramas Vargas continued trying to “sell” Cuba to potential investors and listed the province’s main export products: “Hand-rolled cigars, tobacco wrappers, honey, and some agricultural products such as avocado, mango, and habanero chili peppers. We also have ginger and turmeric,” he said. He also pointed to hibiscus, which is part of a province-wide cultivation program. “Understand that a ton of hibiscus flower on the international market is worth around 2,000 dollars,” he emphasized.
Before anyone could point out the obsession with exports while Cubans go hungry, the official clarified that the goal is “to capture hard currency in order to acquire fertilizers, irrigation systems, and machinery, to develop agricultural production in the province and bring both variety and quantity of products to the tables of Artemisa’s residents.” He assured that the export plan is being fulfilled—however, the people remain as badly off as before.
As it expands its business on the Island, Vietnam continues its “solidarity” diplomacy. This Sunday, reporting on the major fundraising drive organized by the Red Cross delegation in Vietnam for Cuba, the state press of both communist countries recycled Fidel’s slogans: “For Vietnam, Cuba is willing to give even its own blood!” they recalled the leader of the Revolution declaring. Vu Viet Trang, director general of the Vietnamese state news agency, echoed the half-century-old message, stating: “Vietnam-Cuba: Always united in difficult times. Solidarity in the face of hardship” and “Vietnam is still there.”
The campaign was part of the activities marking the 65th anniversary of bilateral relations, though donations—many of them rice—go back many years, during which Cuba’s crisis has reduced industry to its bare minimum. Solidarity aside, Vietnamese companies know that doing business on the Island requires constant oversight.
In May 2024, the Vietnamese company leasing land in Pinar del Río, and with several other projects in the Mariel Special Development Zone, Agri VMA, had to write to three Cuban ministers to demand release of funds frozen in its account at the state-owned Banco Financiero Internacional. The situation prevented it from sending $300,000 dollars to its headquarters in Vietnam to buy essential inputs for production at its factory in Mariel.
First published in Spanish by 14ymedio and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.
As the article clearly points out: “The Vietnamese side committed to providing machinery, initial supplies, fertilizers, personnel, and working capital . . . “ The Vietnamese company will be supplying the “personnel”. What does that mean? Does the Vietnamese company bring to Cuba their own people from Vietnam to provide the management, plus the labor?
That can’t be the case because further in the paragraph it clearly states: “Meanwhile, the Cuban company contributes the land, factories and warehouses, labor, . . .” What does that mean? Does the Cuban company supply “labor” meaning that work under the hot, searing sun, that hard physical labor that perhaps the Vietnamese “personnel”, that is, Vietnamese management will not do?
How much money will Cuban labor be paid under the direction of the Cuban company working for the Vietnamese company relative to what a Vietnamese labourer doing the same agricultural work is paid in Vietnam? The Vietnamese in their home country are extremely progressive in their industrial and agricultural pursuits paying timely livable wages to their management personnel and to their labourers.
Not so in Cuba for the past 60 plus years. Will the Cuban government abandon, perhaps modify, their ideological totalitarian archaic beliefs and begin to pay their labour a timely living wage so that the Cuban workers on these collaborative agriculture projects feel appreciated, feel valued and their salaries reflective of this “new” cooperative initiative?
If not, the chronic and continuous lack of perpetual productivity in the country will not only be brought about by the continuous lack of fuel to power the machinery, but the Cuban company and the Vietnamese company may find themselves with a chronic shortage of Cuban labour.
The Cuban totalitarian government is always ready to expound its so called imaginary attributes to the world; however, in actual fact as the current reality clearly demonstrates the totalitarian leaders constantly revert back to worn out, archaic, out of touch, ideological slogans: “Fidel’s slogans: “For Vietnam, Cuba is willing to give even its own blood!” they recalled the leader of the Revolution declaring.” Perhaps in the 50s certainly not circa 2025.
And the Vietnamese in Cuba not to be out done with an ideological comrade and surely realizing a capitalist opportunity to make money “. . . . echoed the half-century-old message, stating: “Vietnam-Cuba: Always united in difficult times.” The astute aspiring Vietnamese capitalists fully understand that to garner business in Cuba marketing a few Revolutionary ideological slogans is good for amicable business.
As the article clearly states: “Solidarity aside, Vietnamese companies know that doing business on the Island requires constant oversight.” Yes – absolutely. That “constant oversight” is the Revolutionary platitudes that always work well with prospective ideological partners – Cuba and Vietnam.
In conclusion, if Cuban labor continues to not being paid their deserved earned wages on a timely basis, both the Cuban company and the Vietnamese company may find that their united propaganda slogans may make for good sound bites; however, in the final analysis agricultural production without committed Cuban labourers certainly will fail to meet the hunger needs of the Cuban population.