Russians Aspire To Increase Investment Projects in Cuba
while Cubans see only obstacles
Putin’s envoy, Dmitri Chernichenko, signs 13 cooperation agreements in Havana, without it being known in exchange for what.
HAVANA TIMES – On one side of the long table, the Cuban delegation, chaired by Ricardo Cabrisas and several key ministers; on the other, the Russians, clinging to their headphones and consulting data on modern Mac computers. The photo published this Saturday by Cubadebate – in which Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Chernichenko smiles with satisfaction – is that of two countries in total synchrony.
“The exchange highlighted the intensity of our strategic links and the existing opportunities to continue consolidating bilateral relations in all areas,” Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel insisted in a social media publication.
The reality, however, is that once again the Kremlin offers and Havana takes, a dynamic that Chernichenko himself recently criticized, despite signing 13 agreements beneficial to the Cuban regime this Friday.
The information published about the Russia-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission, which met for the 22nd time this week, is diverse and incomplete, but it reveals important data about the bilateral agenda. The first thing is that Moscow, according to Chernichenko, gave Cuba a “state loan” of 60 million dollars in the form of 100,000 tons of Russian oil that arrived in February, aboard the Akademik Gubkin.
That credit is part of a Kremlin plan that, according to the Russians, aims to “minimize the consequences of the energy crisis that Cuba has been experiencing since last year,” which, however, has not prevented four widespread blackouts in the last six months. There are three Russian companies, they said, evaluating the Cuban electricity debacle through “integral reviews.”
Last January, an investment by the Kremlin financed the start-up of the exploitation of several oil wells in Boca de Jaruco. The process – given the low quality of Cuban crude oil – is extremely cumbersome and unprofitable, but Chernichenko expressed his hope that these facilities, directed by the Russian oil company, Zarubezhneft, will allow Cuba “to obtain oil and reduce its dependence on the import of this fuel” (national crude oil cannot be refined on the Island and is used only for thermoelectric plants).
The high-ranking official also stated that about 160,000 Russian tourists had arrived in Cuba in 2024, “which coincides with the record of 2023.” The figure does not coincide with what was proclaimed by the Cuban authorities, who had raised the number of visitors from Russia to 185,800, a “record” that exceeded 184,000 in 2023.
The number provided by Chernichenko casts even more doubt on the credibility of Cuban statistics and removes reasons for optimism this year. The number has fallen by almost 50% in January and February: from 43,859 Russian visitors last year to 22,306 this year.
Moscow has focused on the transport sector, with several Russian companies having just participated in the sector’s international fair held this week in Havana. “Soon,” Chernichenko said, they will send 50 Moskvitch cars to the Island to operate as taxis in the capital.
The Russians also promised to “resume” the shipment of vehicles (last year they sent 180 vehicles and spare parts). Now, in addition, they will open an assembly complex between UAZ – the legendary Russian brand – and a Cuban company. There are other minor projections in the field of wheat milling, the impoverished sugar sector and the construction of at least one hotel only for Russians.
The request that Chernichenko made to parliamentary leader Esteban Lazo in Moscow, a week ago, was repeated personally before Cabrisas. “We aspire to increase investment projects,” he stated. However, everything has remained in projections, promises and invitations to more meetings. The senior Russian official highlighted that he had stayed at the Northern Keys of Ciego de Ávila, to experience “Cuban nature” firsthand.
The only quote that Cubadebate picked up from Cabrisas, architect of the rapprochement with Moscow, says everything about Havana’s vagueness and lack of will: “The obstacles we face are clear.” Neither Prime Minister Manuel Marrero, who was later photographed with Chernichenko and Cabrisas, nor President Miguel Díaz-Canel, who met with the Kremlin envoy this Friday, had a voice or vote in the meeting.
There is another trip on the horizon: Díaz-Canel’s to Moscow next month, at the invitation of Vladimir Putin himself – as Chernichenko stressed – to attend the parade for the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. At that time, the president will pose again with other Putin satellite leaders, such as the Belarusian Aleksandr Lukashenko, the longest-serving dictator in Europe.
“Respect, trust and transparency” is the mantra that, according to its organizers, governs the meetings between the Kremlin and Havana. The three values have been more than denied by reality: Cuba seems not to have much respect for its creditor, nor does Russia have confidence in its “favorite partner,” and neither of the two Governments is transparent about where their alliance is going.
Translated by Regina Anavy for Translating Cuba.
The real cooperation between Cuba and Russia is more likely never going to be known publicly. The exchange of signal and other intelligence information along with other anti-US assets is where the rubber meets the road. The trinkets spoken of in this post are meaningless.
A critical mind might ask: what exactly does Russia gain from maintaining a relationship with a crumbling country halfway across the globe – a nation whose entire population doesn’t even match that of Moscow? While the two countries share a broadly similar political outlook, their ideologies are far from identical. Russia may have communist roots, but it has clearly deviated from that path. Today, it is a highly capitalistic society where citizens are allowed and even encouraged to start and own businesses.
Cuba, by contrast, remains a socialist dystopia. The state owns or controls nearly all means of production, dictates wages, rations food, and tightly regulates every facet of daily life. The Castroist regime maintains an iron grip on the nation, and the population lives under a system that suppresses personal and economic freedoms.
Russia doesn’t engage in foreign partnerships out of generosity or goodwill. Pouring capital into Cuba is a financial black hole – it’s highly unlikely to be repaid, and the economic return is negligible. Instead, Russia’s involvement appears to be a strategic attempt to win over the hearts and minds of a population that has been isolated and fed a singular narrative. Many Cubans have been conditioned to believe their suffering is solely the result of U.S. sanctions, and Russia steps in to offer symbolic gestures of support – scraps, really.
After all, what is $60 million, or $100 million, or even a few hundred vehicles between countries? Practically nothing. For context, in January 2025, Russia was earning approximately €687 million (about $752 million) PER DAY from fossil fuel exports alone. The aid it sends to Cuba is a rounding error.
And yet, none of this will meaningfully improve the lives of ordinary Cubans. By the time the regime takes its cut, only crumbs, if anything, will reach the people.
Viva la revolución! … NOT!