Policy Turnaround in Venezuela during the Trump Era?
The movement on the chess board signifies, at least immediately, Trump’s acknowledgment that Maduro in power is a valid interlocutor.
By Gerardo Arreola* (Confidencial)
HAVANA TIMES – Among the first moves by Donald Trump in Latin America, perhaps the most influential in the region is the approach to Venezuela.
It wasn’t Secretary of State Marco Rubio or the envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, who spoke with Nicolas Maduro, but Richard Grenell, an envoy for special missions or for “the most conflict-ridden places,” like Venezuela and North Korea, as Trump said.
Grenell returned from Caracas with six US citizens, freed within hours, and the commitment that the country would accept deported migrants.
In Maduro’s version, the visit was a recognition of his regime, challenged by the opposition, electoral observers, and dozens of governments due to the lack of results from the July 2024 presidential elections.
Rubio dismissed such recognition and instead launched the threat that the United States has “many options to inflict serious harm” on Venezuela.
Beyond the rhetoric, it seems that the agenda between the two countries has just shifted.
On February 5, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ordered the removal of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for about 600,000 Venezuelans in two phases (April 7 and September 10).
With TPS, since 1990 the United States has sheltered people for 18 months, extendable, who have fled their countries due to extreme difficulties. To date, there are also beneficiaries from more than ten countries, including El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Ukraine.
DHS Secretary Kristi Noem said that in Venezuela, there have been “notable improvements” allowing “these citizens to return safely to their country.”
But even with adverse conditions, she added, the presence of these Venezuelans is against the national security of the United States due to a “potential link” with a “criminal gang,” a reference to the Tren de Aragua.
The Key Is Oil
During his first term, Trump imposed restrictions on Venezuela for crude oil exports. Later, Joe Biden granted individual licenses, such as for the US company Chevron.
Thanks to this relief, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has increased its exports, which in January reached around 867,000 barrels per day, with 294,000 of those sent to the US, its second-largest client after China, according to Reuters.
On the day of his inauguration, Trump stated that there was no reason to continue buying Venezuelan oil. Furthermore, the litigation over Citgo, the Texas refinery owned by Venezuela, remains unresolved, with its assets blocked by Washington since 2020, and Maduro claims profits amounting to about five billion dollars.
On February 1, Trump allowed Chevron’s license to be automatically renewed for six months. An increase in the country’s production, which holds the world’s largest oil reserves, aligns with the White House’s strategy to lower crude prices.
A key figure for Grenell’s trip was oil magnate Harry Sargeant III, according to The Miami Herald. A large donor to the Republicans in Florida, he has long sought business deals with PDVSA and has spoken with Maduro, as he told Reuters in a 2019 interview.
New Scenario for Venezuela
The shift on the board signifies, at least immediately, Trump’s acknowledgment that Maduro in power is a valid interlocutor. Authoritarian regimes are drawing closer. Venezuela’s opposition loses ground, and the controversy over the post-electoral crisis and the regime’s legitimacy is declining.
This bridge is more useful to Maduro than the diplomatic disaster that erupted after the presidential elections.
Only in Latin America, by this point, Venezuela’s relations are severed with Paraguay and Peru and frozen with six other countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay). Two of the closest, Colombia and Brazil, are among the governments demanding electoral transparency.
Venezuela has a dispute with Paraguay, a mix of politics and finance, over a PDVSA debt of about 400 million dollars, and it has been forced into military coordination with Colombia, facing violence on the shared border. Until just a few weeks ago, Venezuela’s mere presence was contentious in the Community of Latin American States (Celac). Maduro’s government is no longer part of the Organization of American States (OAS), but it was the subject of a damning report from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Despite increasing its oil sales to its main markets, PDVSA has reduced deliveries to Cuba. Why this drop, which has wreaked havoc on its primary ally in the region? There’s no public explanation available.
An unofficial version says that, under the conditions of that supply, Caracas doesn’t release the corresponding payment to PDVSA in time. In any case, it’s notable that there have been no high-level Venezuelan visits to Cuba in at least a year.
It remains to be seen what Russia, a close ally of Venezuela and now an active participant in a fluid dialogue with the United States, will do in this scenario.
This article was originally published on Medium.