Less Venezuelan Oil, Worse for the Cuban Regime

Vehicles driving down a street in Havana, Cuba, on July 9, 2025. Photo: EFE/Ernesto Mastrascusa

By Yoani Sánchez (Confidencial)

HAVANA TIMES – A quarter-century ago, the signing of an oil agreement between Havana and Caracas propped up the survival of the Cuban model. After the end of Soviet subsidies, Hugo Chávez filled the void left by the Kremlin and became the greatest benefactor of Castroism.

However, that hefty support—around 55,000 barrels of crude oil per day (bpd)—has gradually dwindled over time. In June 2025, only 8,000 bpd reached the island. With that historic low, nervousness is spreading through the regime’s upper echelons.

Whereas 25 years ago the guarantee of Venezuelan oil halted the timid economic reforms initiated by Fidel Castro, the current decline in the arrival of tankers from the South American country now directly threatens the system’s survival.

At a time of extreme economic fragility for Miguel Díaz-Canel’s administration, and with a summer already marked by scattered public protests, the lack of fuel is even undermining the repressive apparatus’s ability to respond.

There’s not just a gasoline shortage affecting the movement of shock troops against protesters—like those in neighborhoods such as Guanabacoa in Havana who have recently staged pot-banging demonstrations over long blackouts. Political propaganda is also suffering from the lack of oil.

State media have drastically reduced their on-the-ground coverage; the spokespeople for the Plaza de la Revolución, despite their privileges, are also suffering from the effects of power outages on telecommunications. Even the police are struggling to deploy patrols across Cuba.

The Regime Becomes More Fragile

A government forced to maintain an inefficient and sprawling network of ministries, institutions, and official entities becomes very fragile when it lacks the resources to sustain the systems of subsidies and clientelism that keep it afloat. The oil deficit affects not only its capacity to generate electricity, but also its ability to wage the ideological battle.

Even the once-impressive cyber combat force that harassed independent journalists and activists on social media has been hit hard by the decline in Venezuelan shipments.

Little remains of that swarm of clarias—as they are popularly called, referring to an invasive catfish species that devours everything in its path through Cuban rivers. Trained to repeat slogans and overwhelm forums debating island issues, the digital militiamen have faded from sight in step with the depletion of the country’s crude oil reserves.

No matter how many perks they receive, the fuel crisis is hitting them hard. With telecommunications antennas shut down, official media servers offline, and air conditioning units in ministry offices no longer working, that army of virtual fighters has been significantly diminished.

On the Malecón seawall, Habaneros gather at sunset to escape the heat, scanning the horizon for any sign of light. It might be a ship loaded with fuel coming to ease their daily hardships. The same gesture—only more desperate—is repeated from the windows of the offices and residences of Cuba’s ruling elite.

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This article was originally published by Deutsche Welle (DW).

Published in Spanish by Confidencial and translated and posted in English by Havana Times.

Read more from Cuba here on Havana Times.

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