Bolivia: The Challenges Facing Rodrigo Paz’s Government
By Franz Flores Castro (Latinoamérica21)
HAVANA TIMES – The center-left candidate of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Rodrigo Paz, won with 54% of the votes, gaining nearly a ten-point lead over his rival, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga. This victory not only ends two decades of hegemony by the Movement for Socialism (MAS), led by Evo Morales, but also grants strong legitimacy to the new administration. However, the political challenges awaiting the Paz government, which will take office on November 9, are considerable.
The first major test for Paz will be consolidating his power base in the legislature. The main weakness lies in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) functioned as a “rented womb,” an instrumental structure lacking social or national roots to support his candidacy. Although Paz captured votes from the MAS “hard core” in several regions, he did not inherit the party’s organizational structure or its mobilization capacity. This partisan weakness creates two points of friction.
Within the PDC caucus, multiple factions may emerge, each seeking its share of power. The tensions already evident between Paz and his running mate, Edman Lara, during the campaign could deepen, complicating both executive governance and management of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.
Paz must also negotiate consensus with other parties. While he enjoys explicit support from Samuel Doria Medina’s Unidad alliance—which materialized in the runoff—relations with Quiroga’s party, LIBRE, are more strained. Although they share ideological affinities (market economy, external openness, respect for institutions), the aftershocks of an aggressive campaign make a potential alliance difficult. A simple majority in the legislature is secured through the PDC–Unidad alliance, but for deeper reforms, such as a possible constitutional change, Paz will need to approach and make deals with LIBRE, which holds the key to the necessary two-thirds.
A second crucial challenge will be managing relations with Bolivia’s powerful and decisive social movements. Their support for the PDC ticket, while key to its victory, does not guarantee unconditional loyalty. With a strong record of political empowerment, these organizations will seek to protect their privileges and, if they feel disadvantaged, could resort to mobilizations threatening social stability. Their backing will be essential to legitimize any economic and social adjustments. Managing tensions with these sectors—and how the new government handles the legacy of “MAS”—will be vital for maintaining the country’s stability. In many ways, these are anti-system forces capable of obstructing Paz’s government.
The new administration’s ability to implement any economic or social policy will depend on overcoming these two political challenges: securing a legislature aligned with the executive and effectively coordinating with social movements.
Once those political obstacles are addressed, the next major challenge is economic. Paz inherits a country in crisis, marked by a shortage of U.S. dollars, inflation, and declining international reserves. Eliminating fuel subsidies—a crucial measure for fiscal sustainability—could spark serious social unrest. The precedent of 2010, when Evo Morales was forced to reverse a similar adjustment under pressure from social movements, underscores how delicate this situation is.
October 19 not only marked the end of a political era but also opened a crucial question: Is Bolivia heading toward real transformation—or merely a continuation of the MAS model by other means?
The answer will define the nation’s direction in the coming years. If Rodrigo Paz’s new government opts for the first path, it will be essential to implement structural reforms to strengthen democratic institutions. These would include reducing presidential powers and establishing a judicial system free from political influence.
If, on the other hand, the Paz government focuses solely on solving the most pressing economic problems—such as inflation and fuel shortages—while ignoring their deeper causes, the MAS model could persist. That model is characterized by a narrow-based economy, lacking significant industrialization and stable job creation.
It is likely that MAS, now without a parliamentary majority, will initially offer some room for maneuver to the new administration. However, the political landscape will not be fully defined until next year’s partial elections, when the new balance of power becomes clearer. For now, Bolivia is taking its first steps out from under MAS’s hegemonic rule and Morales’s long shadow.
Franz Flores is a political scientist, professor, and researcher at the University of San Francisco Xavier (Sucre, Bolivia). He holds a PhD in Social Sciences with a specialization in Political Studies from FLACSO–Ecuador.