Cuba: The “Fine Print” of the Photovoltaic Solar Parks
By Amado Viera
HAVANA TIMES – The same Chinese company that designed the Soyea decoder box models for Cuba’s failed digital television project is now one of the suppliers of panels used in the photovoltaic development program with which the Government intends to resolve the island’s electricity crisis.
That company is Hangzhou Duojia Technology Co. Limited, a business group that appears to operate under the hybrid model of “private-state ownership” that Chinese authorities promote within their international expansion policy. Hangzhou Duojia Technology is registered with the Cuban Chamber of Commerce as an importer of “fabrics and hides, hardware, and automobile parts and pieces,” but since 2024 its operations have also extended to new energy generation technologies, particularly photovoltaics.
This was revealed in November of last year by the company’s president, Qiaoming Huang, who confirmed his company’s involvement in the mega-project for transitioning to renewables being carried out by the administration of President Miguel Diaz-Canel. “We believe solar panels are the ultimate solution in this country, where there is more than enough sun to solve the changes in the energy matrix,” he told Reuters news agency during the Havana International Fair.
Qiaoming’s remarks stand out amid the near-total lack of information surrounding the installation of the dozens of photovoltaic parks with which Cuba aims to generate 1,200 megawatts (MW) before the end of this year. Another 800 MW of solar power will come online as part of a gradual program originally set to finish in 2028, later “adjusted” to 2031 by the Minister of Energy and Mines, Vicente La O Levy.
Expanding into this new business field likely wasn’t difficult for Hangzhou Duojia Technology, since, according to the Made-in-China business directory, it is part of a larger conglomerate called WSL that includes companies specialized in the development of various types of equipment, hardware, and construction materials.
In major emerging East Asian economies, such business groups—known as chaebol in South Korea—are common. They form through the union of companies and financial groups. It’s typical for them to operate across various sectors, not limiting themselves to one branch of production or services, often benefiting from more or less overt support from their governments. The Samsung conglomerate (in South Korea) and Thai Binh (in Vietnam) are examples of this business model.
In China, the Zhejiang Geely Holding Group stands out, producer of the well-known Geely cars and majority shareholder in companies like Mercedes-Benz and Volvo. In recent years, it has also expanded into markets such as aerial mobility. Significantly, both Geely and Hangzhou Duojia Technology are headquartered in Zhejiang, a province near Shanghai, China’s financial capital, where Cuba maintains an active consulate.
Government-to-Government Agreement
Since the inauguration of the first of the 55 solar parks scheduled to come online during 2025, Cuban state media has focused on technical details and the economic benefits they’ll bring. But none of the reports addressed the key question of their cost and how it will be paid.
Information on this issue is only available in a piecemeal fashion. For example, the investment amount per solar park is a figure that both the Minister of Energy and Mines and the directors of the Electric Union have omitted from all their appearances. The only available reference was provided in February by the director of the electric company in Matanzas, Jorge Alejandro Rodríguez: about $16 million is invested in equipment imports per park—or just over $730,000 per installed MW.
In principle, this cost is similar to average new photovoltaic investments in different parts of the world. According to Periódico de la Energía, a respected Spanish publication specializing in the field, the Spanish government budgeted around $600,000 per new MW of photovoltaic generation for the current decade. That figure is significantly more competitive than those of other countries due to the large volume of planned investments in Spain through 2030 (large scale production lowers costs), and because Spain manufactures many of the components used in building its parks, Periódico noted. In most of the world, investment in new photovoltaic plants ranges from $800,000 to $1.5 million per MW, depending on the complexity of each project.
As for “national currency financing”—the bureaucratic term for expenses assumed by Cuban companies—there are no reliable statistics. In the aforementioned interview, Jorge Alejandro Rodriguez said these projects typically receive a one-million-peso budget for land preparation and the infrastructure needed to operate each park. But a simple calculation calls that statement into question.
Faced with a shortage of labor, at the beginning of the year the Cuban government implemented a special pay system for those working on the photovoltaic parks and the cement plants in Nuevitas and Santiago de Cuba. The new wage scale set a minimum of 20,000 pesos per month (about $55 USD) per employee, with increases based on qualifications and performance.
Considering that each park typically employs 500 to 600 workers, the collective monthly payroll would far exceed 10 million pesos—much more than the amount cited by the official. Multiply that by the six months needed to build each solar plant, and the result is a hefty payroll bill of 600 million pesos per park. And this year alone, the country plans to complete 55 such installations.
How and when such a costly investment will be paid remains a mystery. In December, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz briefly addressed the issue, stating that the island could settle its debts with natural resources. “With national crude and nickel, we’ve managed to secure financing that allowed us to acquire solar panels,” he told the National Assembly of People’s Power. However, much of the nickel industry’s profits are already committed to repaying an earlier debt to the Canadian corporation Sherritt, and Cuba’s crude oil has even more limited potential, given its low quality and small production volume.
Another theory that’s been spreading lately suggests that Havana may be offering Beijing favorable conditions for establishing its companies on the island—or even installing radio-electronic espionage centers.
It’s no secret that the agreements between Cuba’s Electric Union and the technology providers for its new solar parks are heavily influenced by the close relationship between the two countries’ governments. In fact, officials from Cuba’s consulate in Shanghai have regularly visited Zhejiang province for years. That diplomatic office’s social media pages contain posts as far back as 2021 documenting meetings between Cuban diplomats and executives from companies like Hangzhou Duojia Technology.
Doubts About a “Political” Decision
The $1.5 billion Cuba is investing in importing equipment for its future photovoltaic parks should guarantee a stable energy supply—but it seems it won’t. Solar generation will hardly help reduce nighttime blackouts, which are precisely when they cause the greatest disruption to the daily lives of island residents.
Despite the scale of the program, only four parks are currently planned to include energy storage systems: two in Havana, one in Holguín, and one in Granma. Each of those battery banks will have a capacity of 50 MW—insufficient to meet even the nighttime demand of a small municipality.
Storage systems are among the most expensive components of any photovoltaic project, so it’s somewhat understandable that the Cuban government relegated them to a lower priority when budgeting. Moreover, virtually all the electricity produced by the parks will have a guaranteed “market”: in the past two years, Cuba’s midday “generation deficits” have consistently exceeded 1,000 MW—a figure similar to the total maximum output of the complexes slated for synchronization this year.
The maintenance of the parks is another issue about which little is known. International experience has shown that solar panels lose between 0.5% and 1% of their generating capacity annually, and that their useful life doesn’t extend beyond 25 to 30 years. Over the decades, Cuba has amassed many stories of investments launched without provisions for equipment depreciation or future repairs. A stark example is the electric industry itself, completely depleted for that reason.
These and other questions should have been raised by lawmakers during the last session of the National Assembly, when the Minister of Energy and Mines gave his report. But the photovoltaic development program was not questioned—neither then nor earlier, when it was first proposed. No one questioned the project tenders or the supplier contracts either. Chinese companies had already secured them long before, thanks to the behind-the-scenes support of their government. In deals like this, political considerations often weigh as heavily—or more so—than technological ones.